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ABSTRACT
SOCRATES AND GREGORY VLASTOS
:
THE POWER OF ELENCHOS IN THE GORGIAS
September 1994
ASLI GOCER, B . A
. ,
BENNINGTON COLLEGE
M.A., NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
Gregory Vlastos claims that in the Gorgias Socrates is
confident that the elenchos is the only and the final
arbiter of moral truth. Traditionally, the object of
elenchos has been viewed as not one of moral truth, but one
of simply revealing to Socratic interlocutors confusions and
muddles within themselves, thereby jarring their
unquestioning adherence to some moral dogma. On Vlastos'
view, however, Socrates claims that he proves by elenchos
that an interlocutor's thesis is false. How can he, when in
point of logic all he has proved is that the thesis is
inconsistent with the agreed-upon premises in that argument
whose truth Socrates does not undertake to establish? While
Vlastos attempts to solve what he calls "the problem of
elenchos" with all the ingenuity that we have come to expect
from him, I argue that there are two major obstacles in his
way. First, elenchos is not the only arbiter of moral truth
v
in the Goirgias. Socrates has a number of other reasons for
believing certain things, but according to Vlastos, Socrates
looks to elenchos, and to nothing but that, for the truth of
his beliefs. I argue that, first, Vlastos' characterization
of elenchos is unsatisfactory, for on his criteria it is
difficult to distinguish it from other kinds of arguments.
This in turn seriously hampers a proper evaluation of
elenctic arguments. I then show that at least in this
dialogue Socrates has certain religious beliefs that he
holds without relying on elenchos, and so elenchos is not
the only avenue for acquiring moral knowledge.
Under Vlastos' correcting lenses, Socrates emerges also
as a morally upright philosopher who would never knowingly
conduct fallacious arguments. I argue that Socrates cheats
at elenchos, and he does so in order to win over his
interlocutors. I conclude that because of certain
assumptions Vlastos makes about the character of the model
philosopher and the model method, he exaggerates the
strength of elenchos. If I am right, the Gorgias is witness
to, not the power of elenchos as Vlastos would have us
believe, but its limitations.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Project
This is a dissertation on what Gregory Vlastos takes to
be Socrates ' method in philosophical argument. In the past
few decades, Vlastos' unceasing flow of articles and books
investigating various aspects of Socratic philosophy has
singlehandedly set the tone in Socratic scholarship.
According to Vlastos' own assessment, more studies on
Socrates have been published per year in the past 15 years
than there were per decade from the turn of the century
until the late 1970s. In this dissertation, I concentrate
on the issues concerning Socratic method and moral knowledge
raised by Vlastos. Although the debate is new, the
questions are ancient: What does Socrates think he does in
his puzzling arguments? What does he in fact manage to
establish in driving his associates into intellectual
deadlocks? Just what does he know about moral matters? If
he knows something, why does he say he does not, and more
importantly, how does he know what he knows? Due to these
and related questions that Vlastos has forcefully put to
debate, Socratic scholarship is now enjoying lively
discussions occupying much of the journals, conferences, and
studies, to which I hope to contribute with this work.
The answers to the twin questions of what Socrates
does, and how he does what he does, are fundamental in
2evaluating the content of the general Socratic project.
Given the commonly held view that Socrates is in many
respects the "father" of philosophy, Vlastos' work on
Socratic method and Socratic conduct is exceedingly
important in giving us a glimpse of the model philosopher.
That is, if we can understand how he argues, and what he
establishes by his arguments, we can better evaluate his
specific claims about morality, and the moral life. By
understanding the nature of his method, we can also better
appraise his own conduct as a philosopher.
One of the most distinctive features of Vlastos' work
on Socratic method is its innovative explanations for
apparent inconsistencies in the text. In Vlastos' exegesis,
there is always a way to vindicate Socrates: Vlastos'
Socrates is a philosopher who has no views inconsistent with
one another, and Socrates is a man who has no actions
inconsistent with his views. Though Vlastos puts forward a
radical view of the Socratic method, he does so by accepting
a fairly conventional view of a perfect Socrates, both as a
man and as a philosopher. This dichotomy in Vlastos'
thinking, and the philosophical issues that arise from it,
comprise the main theme of my investigation.
Starting with the publication of his seminal piece,
"The Socratic Elenchus ," 1 Vlastos painted a picture of the
philosopher as a good man, and his method as the perfect
1 Vlastos ( 7a ]
.
3method required to acquire and impart positive moral
doctrines. The aim of this dissertation is to bring to
light some of the problems that show up in this picture.
This is important for the fact that Vlastos and his
interpretation of Socrates is forcing a new direction in the
scholarship that frequently inhibits a natural reading of
the texts. In what follows, I present Vlastos' picture of
Socrates and his method, and address two specific claims
Vlastos makes: That the Socratic method is the required
tool for moral knowledge, and that Socrates does not misuse
his method and cheat. These are the two critical points in
this debate on method and knowledge, upon which I profoundly
disagree with Vlastos.
Before I turn to a discussion of these points, let me
first give the outline of the dissertation. In this
chapter, I present the scope of my project. I qualify whom
I mean by 'Socrates' and what I understand the Socratic
Method to be. I present a summary of the Gorgias
,
the
dialogue that plays the most significant part in
understanding Vlastos' interpretation of the method. Here I
also explain what chronology of the Platonic dialogues I
will follow, and explain how I deal with the Greek texts.
In Chapter 2, I give a brief history of the treatment
of elenchos by the leading Platonic scholars prior to
Vlastos' account of it. This chapter provides the
background information needed to evaluate Vlastos'
4contribution to the field. As it stands, it is a summary
chapter.
In Chapter 3, I present the evolution of Vlastos' views
on elenchos. I start with his famous Introduction to the
Protagoras in 1956, in which he argued that Socrates is
committed to suspend judgement about the truth of the belief
he is examining by the very logic of his method. 2 There he
maintained that the Socratic elenchos was impotent in
providing knowledge of any kind. Elenchos was good only for
increasing one's insight into the logical relations between
propositions, and exposing the inconsistency of a set of
propositions. Vlastos revoked this view in 1983, and argued
that elenchos was plenty powerful in generating moral
knowledge. He claimed that Socrates can prove, together
with certain assumptions, that the conclusion of a specific
elenchos is true, and the interlocutor's initial claim
tested in the elenchos is false. 3 Under Vlastos' correcting
lenses, Socrates came into focus as a philosopher who
acquired moral knowledge by means of elenctic
justification. 4 So Chapter 3 is mostly devoted to tracing
: Vlastos [13], p.xxxi.
3 Vlastos [7a], p.40.
4 Vlastos wrote that what he could not see in 1956 was that first,
Socrates' assertion of ignorance was not ignorance in all areas of
knowledge, and second, Socratic knowledge needed to be qualified as
"elenctic" knowledge. Vlastos [2], p.269, cf. Vlastos [5], p.11-14.
5the startling change in Vlastos' thinking throughout his
career.
In Chapter 3, I also mention, albeit briefly, the
debate which erupted after Vlastos' 1983 piece. Two "camps"
emerged in understanding the logic and operation of the
Socratic examination, and evaluation of its results.
Agreeing with Vlastos, some argued that the Socratic method
was constructive, but disagreed as to the extent. Some took
issue with the form or the purpose of the argument that
Vlastos was ascribing to Socrates, and others argued that
Vlastos could not account for the fallacies in elenchoi. 5
Other scholars opposed the idea altogether. Some argued that
elenchos could establish only the inconsistency of a set of
propositions, not the falsehood of a particular member of
this set. 6 I conclude Chapter 3 by presenting Vlastos' most
recent work on elenchos, published shortly before he died in
1991, and the latest revision which has been published
posthumously this winter. In his latest analysis, elenchos
is more powerful than ever as the only method in moral
philosophy required to obtain moral knowledge. Here I
discuss the role of mathematics which Vlastos claims
contributed to the demise of elenchos in the later
dialogues
.
5 Kahn [ 1 ] , and [ 2 ) .
6 For a nonconstructivist account of elenchos, see especially
Benson [ 1 ] and [ 6 ]
.
6Chapter 4 is my critique of Vlastos 's claim that
Socrates needs elenchos to obtain moral knowledge. Against
this
,
I argue that Vlastos account ascribes to elenchos too
much epistemic power, and overlooks the importance of
certain beliefs that Socrates holds without relying upon
elenchos, in particular, religious beliefs. Vlastos either
neglects or willfully omits a serious discussion of the role
of the eschatological myth in the Gorgias. I argue that
this myth is an elaborate expression of some of the beliefs
that Socrates holds, without which no elenchos could get off
the ground. If I am right, the Socratic project is best
understood as a form of preaching which relies on elenchos,
not to discover it as Vlastos has it, but to spread the good
word
.
Chapter 5 is my critique of Vlastos' claim that
Socrates would never cheat in argument since that would be
antithetical to doing philosophy. This chapter is mostly
devoted to evaluating the notorious Socratic refutation of
Polus in the Gorgias. The argument is seriously flawed.
Vlastos argues that what appears to be a deliberate fallacy
is in fact an intellectual slip on Plato's part. Against
this, I argue that if Vlastos is serious about the
historicity of the Socrates in the Gorgias , then he cannot
consistently argue for the conclusions that Plato would have
drawn about philosophy and sophistry. For Vlastos' general
reluctance to attribute to the Socratic method certain
7unsavory characteristics is due the fact that he thinks
Socratic method is clearly distinct from the sophistical.
This conclusion fails to square not only with historical but
also with the textual evidence. In the rest of the chapter,
I show why there are compelling reasons to believe that
Socrates cheats.
In Chapter 5, I also address Vlastos' presumption of
the persuasive competence of elenchos. Vlastos would have
us believe that elenchos can and indeed does refute the
views of the interlocutors of Socrates, and furthermore, by
such refutation persuades them into leading virtuous lives.
I argue that in this dialogue, Socrates in fact fails to
convince them that such a life is more advantageous. If I
am right, the Gorgias, instead of being the paradigm of the
persuasive efficacy of elenchos in turning people onto the
virtuous life as Vlastos believes, is the dialogue which
illustrates Plato's pessimism about it.
The Appendix is concerned with a puzzling claim that
Socratic elenchos is the same practice as dialectic. In
showing the four senses of 'dialectic' (generic, Zenonian,
Platonic, and Aristotelian) I argue that the claim that
elenchos is dialectic is either vacuously true, or false in
other specific senses.
Vlastos' Socrates
The Socrates that this work will have as its subject is
Plato's Socrates as presented and defended by Vlastos. Just
8who Socrates is, and what we can know about the historical
man, known as "the problem of Socrates," is of course a
project unto itself, which I leave to historians
.
7 The
testimonies from Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Aristotle on
the life and work of Socrates have been amply documented in
most of the secondary literature, thus I will not address it
here. For this work is not so much about the historical
authenticity of the views expressed by the character
'Socrates' in Plato's dialogues as it is about the claims
made by Vlastos on the nature of the Socratic method. How
Vlastos establishes the conclusion that there are two
characters in Plato, both named 'Socrates,' also falls
outside the scope of this work . 8 Therefore, from here on, I
shall use 'Socrates' to refer to what Vlastos takes to be
Socrates, that is, the character in the early and
transitional Platonic dialogues. And the Socratic method
7 Here is a sample of some of the competing views on what we can
and cannot know of Socrates, the historical man:
a) It is impossible to know anything about the historical
Socrates, and the only Socrates we can hope to know is the one of the
Platonic dialogues. See Burnet, p.128 ff.
b) Socrates may only be the production of a creative imagination,
namely Plato's. See A.E. Taylor [1], p.25-36.
c) Plato and Socrates are a "continuous" whole; it is not only
impossible but unnecessary to try to separate them. See Hare, p.14;
Ehrenberg, p.373 ff.
d) Plato's Socrates reflects the historical man, Socrates; see
Grote, vol.l, 281; Cornford [2], p.302-309; Hackforth, p.259 ff;
Guthrie, vol III, p. 325 ff.
e) Instead of there being one Socrates in Plato, there are in fact
two of them. The Socrates of the earlier dialogues is representative of
the historical man. See Vlastos [3], p.46 ff, and Brickhouse and Smith
[4] , p . 9 ff
.
8 See Vlastos [3], Chapter Two for the ten theses to establish this
point.
,
p. 47-49 .
9will be the insthod this character exercises in those
dialogues
.
Here I must also make clear just which dialogues I mean
by the "early" and "transitional" dialogues. As is well
known, the precise chronological order of Plato's dialogues
is uncertain. However, the list that Vlastos accepts based
on stylometric and thematic inferences is as follows . 9
Group IA: The earlier dialogues, sometimes known as the
"elenctic dialogues," by alphabetical 10 order and
abbreviation: Apology (Ap.), Charmides (Ch.), Crito (Cr.),
Euthyphro (Eu.), Gorgias (G
.) , Hippias Minor (HMi
. ) , Ion ,
Laches (La.), Protagoras (Pr.), Republic I. (R.)
Group IB: Transitional dialogues by alphabetical order:
Euthydemus (Eud.) f Hippias Major (HMa.) f Lysis (Ly.),
Menexenus (Mx.), Meno (M.).
Group II: The middle dialogues, by probable
chronological order: Cratylus (Cra.), Phaedo (Phd.),
Symposium (Smp.), Republic II-X (R.), Phaedrus (Phdr.),
Parmenides (Prm.), Theaetetus (Tht.)
Group III: The late dialogues, by probable
chronological order: Timaeus (Ti.), Critias (Crit.),
Sophist (Sph.) f Politicus (Pltc.), Philebus (Phlb.), Laws
(Lg.)
9 Vlastos [3], p.45-47; cf. Vlastos [7a]. For differences in the
chronology, see Brandwood [1], p.249-252; Kahn (3).
10 The order is alphabetical because the evidence for a
chronological order within this group is tenuous.
10
The Socrates that Vlastos examines, and by extension I
will examine, is the Socrates of the dialogues only in
groups IA and IB. Although I will say nothing on either the
claim that this Socrates is representative of the historical
man, or the assumption that there are two characters, both
named 'Socrates' in Plato, I will address some of the
problems which result from Vlastos' assumption of both.
A summary of the Goraias
Vlastos' interpretation of the Socratic method hangs
mostly, we might even say exclusively, on the Gorgias
.
On
his view, the dialogue falls somewhere in Group IA, and is
placed much before the Meno
,
which is the last transitional
dialogue in Group IB. Vlastos finds in the Gorgias the
proof for his assertion that Socratic method generates moral
knowledge. Vlastos also makes much of this dialogue as
providing the turning point in Plato's intellectual
development. On Vlastos' view, it is in this dialogue that
we see the last and most powerful example of the Socratic
method as well as the seeds of Plato's interest in geometry.
It is after the Gorgias, Vlastos argues, that Plato starts
his own journey up. Again, though I will say nothing about
the chronology of the dialogues, I will point out some of
the complications that result from Vlastos' stringent
adherence to the relationship between the Gorgias and the
Meno. In the following chapters, I will argue that there
11
3^*6 better ressons for supposing that they ere closer
together than supposing otherwise.
Let me give a brief overview of the theme of the
Gorgias. The dialogue proceeds in three clearly marked
episodes. The first part is a discussion ostensibly between
Socrates and the famous sophist Gorgias, but mostly
conducted with Socrates' eager friend Chaerephon and
Gorgias' ardent follower, Polus. The discussion is about
the nature of rhetoric, as it is the most distinctive
practice of the sophists. 11 Famously, Socrates claims that
rhetoric is a form of flattery, and as such, it is a base
occupation. Hence, since they lead a life teaching and
practicing rhetoric, sophists lead a base form of life.
The second part of the dialogue takes place between the
young 12 admirer of Gorgias, Polus, and Socrates. Polus
argues that sophists live much like tyrants, because they
have power in the city. Like tyrants, sophists can do
whatever they see fit, and get away with it. This assertion
starts a series of arguments against Polus, with Socrates
claiming that no one who lives a life of injustice has true
power, doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice,
and no unjust person who goes unpunished can be happy. At
the end of three specific refutations of his views, Polus is
" See my Chapter Five for a discussion of the sophists.
12 That Polus is young is important for Socrates' views of
philosophical discussion. See my Chapter 5, and Appendix.
12
silenced but remains unconvinced. He leaves the scene to
Callicles
.
A wealthy and established businessman of Athens,
Callicles attacks the Socratic principles of justice, the
just man, and the just life as being childish ideals.
(Callicles thinks that philosophy is best done when young;
these ideals are unbecoming in an old man.) In this section
of the dialogue, Callicles puts forward his notion of what
the just life is. It turns out that his view illustrates
the famous nomos-physis 13 controversy that sophists are
known to indulge in. Morality, according to Callicles,
consists of societal norms drawn up by the weak for their
own protection, for in nature, the strong rule . 14 Happiness
consists in total self-gratification, and letting one's
desires get as big as possible. Against this conception of
happiness, Socrates puts forward some of his views of
orderliness and self-control, which he insists are the true
ingredients of happiness. Psychic order and the orderly
life involves moderation, and subdued desires, according to
Socrates. The unjust suffer from the corruption of excess
in their souls, and as such they cannot be happy. Callicles
13 Nomos is traditionally translated as 'custom' or 'convention' or
'law' meaning, in general terms, the societal norms that are set up to
guide behavior. Physls is usually translated as 'nature' meaning the
way things are in nature. The controversy is over human laws versus
natural laws as the standard for moral evaluation, and is analogous to
modern discussions of relativism and natural law theories. See for the
historical debate Kerferd, p.100-130.
14 See for a discussion of the influence of Callicles' view on
Nietzsche, Dodds [1], p. 387-91.
13
refuses to go along any further in his conversations with
Socrates. Socrates is forced to continue the argument by
himself; playing the part of Callicles, he puts himself
through various cross-examinations. These examinations
culminate in a myth about the after life and the condition
of the souls there. The judges judge the accomplishments of
the souls: they send the just souls the Islands of the
Blessed, and the unjust to receive punishment. The dialogue
ends with Socrates claiming that he believes these accounts,
and so he leads a life consistent with such ideals and calls
on others to do the same.
So, in what follows, Socrates is the figure in the
elenctic and transitional Platonic dialogues, and in
particular, he is the figure in the Gorgias
,
as presented
and defended by Vlastos. Now a note on the Greek in this
work. In quoting from sources in Greek, I consult a variety
of sources. All translations are mine unless otherwise
noted. In first use, I give the transliteration of the
Greek in question, which I do not "latinize" or italicize
unless I quote from others who do.
Elenchos: The Method
Now let me introduce the method of Socrates that I will
be talking about in the coming pages. Let us start with
what Socrates does. First of all, he is an odd 15 fellow.
15
atopos, 'strange', literally, 'out of place'. Many of his
interlocutors are aware of Socrates' 'strangeness,' e.g. G. 494cJ "How
atopos you are, Socrates." (cf. Eud. 305a3; HMi 369b7; Ap. 31c4; Ch.
14
Famously, he spends his life going about the marketplace
instead of earning a living, for instance—conversing with
anyone he happens to meet. As he tells the jury in the
Apology, he talks with anyone, young or old, citizen or
stranger, virtually anyone who would converse with him, (Ap.
29d-e) . Some of his associates observe that whomever
Socrates approaches is bound to be "drawn to him" 16 and
enter into a long argument. We hear Socrates say, for
example, that once he attracts someone into a conversation
with him, "I shall not let him go at once, or leave him, but
I shall question him, examine him [exetasb], and test him
[ elenxb] ,
"
(cf. Ap. 29e, 41b; G. 472c-d; R.I 352d)
.
The activity of testing others and scrutinizing their
views is what Vlastos broadly classifies as the Socratic
method, specifically, elenchos. Elenchos is an art of
cross-examination for the purposes of refutation. Some
scholars trace its etymology to the Homeric use of elenchos,
which means putting someone to shame by refutation. In the
early dialogues, Socrates uses elenchos and its parent verb,
158d2, 167c4, 168al0; Pr. 309b7) For a discussion of this feature of his
personality, see Barabas.
16 Nicias reports: "Whoever comes into close contact with Socrates
and has any talk with him face to face, is bound to be drawn [ananke
auto] by him in the course of the arguments ... and cannot stop until he
is led into giving an account of himself, of the manner in which he now
spends his days, and of the kind of life he has lived hitherto; and when
once he has been led into that, Socrates will never let him go until he
has thoroughly and properly put all his ways to the test." (La. 187e) .
15
elenchein, generously 17 as an activity of critical
examination of the ideas and beliefs of his interlocutors.
He believes elenchos to be his mission 18 in life at god's
command [kata ton theon (Ap . 23b6) ] , and his investigations
to be in the service of the god [ten tou theou latreian (Ap.
23cl)
. ]
We know from the following famous story why Socrates
takes elenchos so seriously. In order to get to the bottom
of the rumors about him—that he was a busybody who
investigated everything and feigned wisdom—his beloved
friend Chaerephon asked the god at Delphi whether there was
a mortal wiser than Socrates. The answer by the medium
Pythia at the oracle is well-known: There was not. At a
loss as to the meaning of this divine proclamation, Socrates
"very reluctantly" [mogis panu {Ap. 21b) ] turned to the
activity of elenchos to investigate human wisdom. He went
around examining those who were reputed wise, "anyone,
citizen or stranger, whom he thinks is wise," thinking if he
could find someone wiser than himself, then he would refute
the oracle. {Ap. 20c, 23b) As a result of such
investigations, people started assuming that Socrates
himself possessed the wisdom that he proved that his
17 There are more than 50 entries for words related to elenchos in
the Gorgias alone. See Brandwood [2],
18
I agree with Brickhouse and Smith's [3] assessment that elenchos
is significant in the context of what Socrates thinks he must do to
arrive at the goals he thinks he has been given by a divine command.
However, whether elenchos is necessary to carry out his service to the
god is a controversy I cannot address here; see Reeve.
16
interlocutor did not have. Then he understood the riddle of
the god: neither he nor anyone else knew anything, but he
was wiser than others in one respect, that he knew that he
was ignorant, and others did not know they were.
These "tests" and "examinations" [elenchoi] almost
always are on questions about moral goodness. By "moral"
Socrates means questions relevant to how one ought to live
(R • 3 52d) , what sort man one should be (G. 487e)
,
and who is
happy and who is not (G. 472c)
.
These issues are addressed
and debated in a general format of question and answer. It
has a few rules. Elenchos is usually short, and almost
always adversary. The answers are required to be short.
Socrates uses as premises the opinions of his interlocutor,
and he ostensibly makes sure that the interlocutor truly
believes in what he expresses as his own belief, and does
not just say that he does. In each case, Socrates either
reaches a conclusion that expresses the negation of some
claim made by his interlocutor, which Socrates had put under
examination, or the argument ends in an impasse, aporia.
Whatever the result, Socrates often ends the elenchos saying
something along the lines of the following: "But as for me,
my position is always the same: I have no knowledge whether
these things are true or not." 19 As a result, he frustrates
and even infuriates his interlocutors who went along with
19 G. 509a, trans. Vlastos in Vlastos [13], p.xxxi; cf. Ch. 165b,
Pr. 348c, 360e, 361c, 361d.
17
his elenchos
. Most of the time they either quit the
argument or simply leave the scene. But sometimes they are
so aggrieved that "men set upon him with their fists and
[tear] his hair out ." 20
Let me then present a summary21 of elenchos as defended
by Vlastos
. This is the method that Vlastos investigates,
and what he has to say about this method is what I will
investigate. Vlastos says,
Socratic elenchus is a search of moral truth by
question-and-answer adversary argument in which a
thesis is debated only if asserted as the
answerer's own belief and is regarded as refuted
only if its negation is deduced from his own
beliefs . 22
In what follows, I will first examine the history of the
treatment of elenchos in the last century. I will then take
up Vlastos' own treatment of it throughout his career.
Finally, I will examine the implications of some of his
assertions about the function and efficacy of what he takes
to be the ultimate method of moral philosophy.
20 Diogenes Laertius, vol. i, II. 21, cf. 31-33.
21 See my Chapter 4 why this summary does not satisfy a definition,
and fails to shed light on our understanding of elenctic arguments.
22 Vlastos [ 1 ] , p. 4 .
CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORY OF ELENCHOS
The Negative Method
In order to appreciate the immense contribution that
Vlastos ' work on the Socratic elenchos has made to the
scholarship, we must first examine the views preceding his.
Some of these views profoundly influenced Vlastos'
s
treatment of elenchos. For the purpose of this work, I will
only mention the views which distinguish Socrates in the
early Platonic dialogues. Among those, I will pick those
whose main themes are explicit on the issue of the Socratic
method, and elenchos. And for the purposes of brevity, I
will only highlight the points pertinent to my discussion
without critical analysis of their merits. 1
Let me first say a few things about method and
elenchos. Socrates never discusses his elenchos as a
method2 ; nor does he reflect on his own practice of it. One
can, of course, practice something and not have a clear
understanding of what one is doing. Just how much Socrates
knows what he is doing is, and has been, just the problem.
1 Though not exhaustive, the list of the most influential sources
that informed Vlastos 's views is as follows by chronology:
(1875) Grote; (1886) Sidgwick; (1914) Burnet; (1929) A . E . Taylor;
(1932) Cornford; (1933) Shorey; (1953) Robinson; (1962) Kneale & Kneale;
(1968) Gulley; (1969) Guthrie; (1977) Irwin; (1979) Santas. See
Bibliography for full references.
2
I am using "method" rather loosely here. There is a mention of
the method (methodos) in the middle to later dialogues, i.e., R. 569a5-
7, 533b2-3 , etc. Socrates of the earlier dialogues does not use this
word. See Vlastos [7a], fn.3, fn.5, and Robinson [1], p.7-10.
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In the scholarly disagreement on this issue, what is
generally accepted is that by his method Socrates drives his
respondents to say contradictory things. This often leaves
them, and at times Socrates himself, perplexed. 3 Socrates
claims all too frequently that he knows nothing of the
answers to the questions he was testing others on. Because
of this profession of ignorance, Socrates has been
appropriated by rival schools of thought throughout the
centuries. While many scholars grant that Socrates could
question others' beliefs without himself having the answer,
many others question whether Socrates could provide any
positive answers by means of his elenchos.
Until Vlastos argued otherwise in 1983, to most
Platonic scholars, including Vlastos himself, Socrates was
the enigmatic gadfly whose only mission in philosophy is to
show the contradiction in people's beliefs with respect to
moral matters. Many scholars had taken his attempts to
refute the opinions of his respondents and his unwillingness
to offer an opinion of his own to be evidence for his
general skepticism. 4 This approach was the characteristic
of many views expressed in the 19th century.
The features of the Socratic method most discussed in
the 19th century were its negative nature, destructive
3 See Matthews [1], on the issue of perplexity [aporia].
4 See Long [1] on the influence of Socrates on Arcesilaus, and
early Stoicism; also see Annas [1] on the New Academy's interpretation
of Plato as a skeptic.
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results, and its distinction from that of the practice of
the sophists. Kierkegaard was one such philosopher who was
troubled by the Socratic method, and what it was supposed to
be for. In his famous doctoral dissertation, Kierkegaard
clsimed that Socrates was "animated only by negativity.
Though he did not specifically address elenchos, Kierkegaard
loosely referred to the Socratic method as "the art of
asking questions." He noted that while the "sophistic" art
consisted of answering questions, Socratic method consisted
in devising ways to expose the arrogance of those who
thought they had all the answers. 6 In Kierkegaard's view,
the purpose of answering questions was to display the wisdom
that the sophists thought they had, the purpose of asking
questions was to expose the fact that the interlocutor knew
nothing at all. The Socratic questioning was done "not in
the interest in obtaining an answer, but to suck out the
apparent content with a question and leave only an emptiness
remaining." The Socratic method was one such questioning,
and it naturally presupposed emptiness and negativity. 7
Eduard Zeller, another 19th century philosopher, also
described the Socratic practice in terms of its negative
5 Kierkegaard, p. 52 ff. No doubt Kierkegaard's Socrates is a
study in itself. However, even briefly stated, his approach relays
important information as to the treatment of Socrates in the academy
towards the end of 19th century.
6 Kierkegaard, p.70, fn *
7 Kierkegaard, p.73 ff.
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results. Zeller took Xenophon's portrayal of Socratic
philosophical conversation seriously. 8 in Xenophon's
analysis, Socrates starts from the common opinions of men to
arrive at general truths. This method, according to Zeller,
is "the art of forming conceptions." Socrates wants to get
at "the unchangeable essence of things" by what Zeller
called "the critical method." This method involved getting
people to shed their erratic views on all matters. So in
Zeller's view, Socratic investigation was a critical
instrument to smooth down "apparent contradictions by
separating what is permanent from what is changing." 9
According to most accounts, George Grote was the first
to use the word 'elenchos' in connection with the Socratic
method. In his Plato and Other Companions of Socrates
,
published in 1875, he described elenchos as the method of
Socratic argumentation. 10 Grote characterized the essential
difference between the sophists and Socrates as being one of
method, namely, elenchos. Vlastos' interpretation of
Socrates is greatly influenced by Grote and his notion of
using elenchos to save Socrates from the charge of being
sophistical. 11 Grote gave no account of what he meant by
8 See for the view that Zeller was naive in accepting Xenophon's
analysis, Vlastos [7a], p.44, fn.43, fn.45, fn.46.
9 Zeller, p.42
10 See Grote for "the negative procedure or Elenchus," vol. i, p.245
ff., and vol.iii, p.466.
11 Vlastos [7a] p.40 ff.; cf. Vlastos [1], Chapter One.
22
"method;" he used the word only to describe a Socratic
procedure. 12 Grote argued, for instance, that while the
sophists arrogantly assumed that they had knowledge and that
they could teach it for a fee, Socrates professed doubt 1 *
and wanted to expose their false conceit. He wrote,
The only way of dissipating such false persuasion
was, the effective stimulus of the negative test,
or cross-examining Elenchus, whereby a state of
non-belief, or painful consciousness of ignorance,
was substituted in its place. 14
Grote argued that Socratic arguments are essentially
negative, because they are not conducted for the purpose of
teaching or finding something, but only to expose and
destroy false conceit of the interlocutors. "The negative
mission of elenchos" was to make men aware of not simply
their ignorance but false and "uncertified" beliefs mistaken
for knowledge. The full purpose of the cross-examination
was thus "to humiliate the respondent, [which] could hardly
fail to offend and exasperate him." 15
Henry Sidgwick also used the word 'elenchos' in
connection with the Socratic method in the late 19th
century. He thought that this method was one of question
and answer. In fact, he wrote that Socrates was the
inventor of the question-and-answer method, and the sophists
Grote, vol. ii, p.198-99.
13 On Cicero's authority, see Grote, vol.l, p.239.
14 Grote, vol. iii, p.245
15 Grote, vol. iii, p.245
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of long speeches. 16 This view also shaped Vlastos' thinking
about the Socratic method as having a format distinct from
that of the method of the sophists. 17 Sidgwick also
characterized the guestion-and-answer method as being
essentially "destructive" and negative." According to
Sidgwick
,
the Socratic method was negative, because it
brought ignorance home to the interlocutors and "exhibited
the scientific need of exact definitions of general
notions," which it was clear they did not have. 18
After the publication of these articles "method" was
taken as a way of loosely referring to the Socratic
elenchos. Was there a standard pattern to the negative
Socratic method? Did it have a standard form? If it did,
what was it like? 19 Kneale and Kneale offered an answer.
They argued that "the standard pattern of refutation
[elenchos]" consisted in an argument form,
1. If p then g.
2. not-q
3. Therefore not-p.
16 Sidgwick [2]. See Nehamas [2] and my Chapter Four for a
criticism of the contemporary avowal of this view: It is not clear who
invented the q&a method. Nor is it clear that long speech cannot be a
part of the Socratic practice, and q&a of the sophistic.
17 Vlastos (7a], p.28, fn.7.
18 Sidgwick [1], p.23-24.
19 Early on in this century, scholars began to raise questions about
the specific form of the method, rather than speculations on its aim.
See Burnet and A.E. Taylor [2] for "hypothetical" method of Plato.
(They did not separate Socratic from Platonic methods.)
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Since elenchos always proceeds with this logical schema,
they argued, "this procedure can lead only to negative
results. " 20
Agreeing in general with the notion that Socratic
method is negative, Richard Robinson offered a different
account of it in the early 1950s. He counted 39 elenchoi in
the early dialogues, which he separated into direct and
indirect elenchoi; he classified 31 of them as indirect. He
identified as indirect elenchos what Kneale and Kneale would
later present as the "standard pattern of refutation." 21 To
refute a thesis indirectly, in Robinson's scheme, is to
deduce a falsehood from that thesis. Suppose, p, which is
the refutand, is offered as the moral belief of an
interlocutor that Socrates wishes to examine, and it is put
through the elenchos. Socrates' aim is to show that p
together with some other premises entail not-p, so that the
interlocutor would rather abandon the thesis, p, than keep
it. The contradictory of the refutand is derived from
itself
.
A direct elenchos, on the other hand, is one in which
the contradictory of the refutand is arrived at from other
premises that the interlocutors also holds true. In a
direct refutation of p, not-p is shown to be entailed by
premises other than p. Robinson claimed that it is not
20 Kneale and Kneale, p.7
21 Robinson [1], p.24.
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always clear whether an argument is direct or indirect, but
elenchos in general is a way of convincing men that they are
ignorant of the things they thought they knew.
For Robinson the negative practice of Socrates had a
positive purpose: moral education. Robinson wrote that "the
ultimate aim of the elenchus" was not so much intellectual
education as it was moral improvement. He said,
The art of elenchus is to find premisses believed
by the answerer and yet entailing the contrary of
his thesis . . . The whole essence of the elenchus
lies in making visible to the answerer the link
between certain of his actual beliefs and the
contradictory of his present thesis. 22
When the person is thus made aware of his contradictory
beliefs, Robinson maintained, he is curious with a desire to
know. Socrates' elenchus was thus a method of implanting
intellectual knowledge in other persons. Robinson was
convinced, however, that elenchos neither imparted knowledge
nor increased it. He said, "[elenchos] only prepares the
ground for it." 23
Elaborating on the theme that the negative procedure of
the Socratic method has a positive goal, Norman Gulley
argued in the late 1960s that the negative and destructive
"manipulation of the elenchus" has an educational goal.
This is the goal of stimulating his respondents to seek out
the truth for themselves. He wrote,
“ Robinson [1], p.15, and p.16.
23 Robinson [1], p.12.
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[Socrates] thought that the provocative shock to theindividual provided by the elenchus
,
and the
realization of the individual's desire to resolve
contradictions could be effective only through directpersonal question. 24
Gulley argued that the educational aim in the Socratic
method consisted in confronting each person individually,
examining his set of beliefs to see if he has the right
set 2S of moral views. By dealing directly with the
individual's opinions, Socrates is able to reveal any
inconsistency and to stimulate search for further truth more
forcibly than by any other method.
The Positive Method
Arguing against all earlier accounts mentioned above,
Terry Irwin maintained in the 1970s that Socratic elenchos
has a constructive purpose and constructive result. 26 In
his Plato's Moral Theory, he argued that elenchos brings
argumentative support for Socrates' affirmative doctrines. 27
Socrates has certain moral principles, which he assumes are
true, and these principles guide and shape the conclusions
‘ Gulley, p.59, cf. 64 ff.
25 The idea of a consistent "set" of moral views is controversial.
See Brickhouse and Smith, [5], p.190 ff. See next chapter.
26 Irwin [6], p.37 ff. This interpretation was based on his general
point that for Socrates moral knowledge is a craft valued for its
results. See Vlastos' objections to the "instrumental" nature of
Plato's moral theory, [9b].
27 This is also my contention. Where I differ from Irwin is that I
claim these affirmative doctrines are Socrates' religious beliefs. See
my Chapter Four. Irwin argued that some of Socrates' positive doctrines
rely on the "analogy between virtue and craft." This issue cannot be
discussed here, but see Irwin [6], p.37; cf . 94, and Vlastos [7a] for
rejection of this view.
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of his elenchoi. The function of elenchos, according to
Irwin, is to perforin both as a tool for criticism and for
discovery. That is why it was a "new approach among
Socrates' contemporaries" to moral questions. Irwin argued,
"The elenchos is not merely destructive and critical. It
yields positive results ." 28
In Irwin's analysis, Socrates is first critical; he
challenges and corrects the constraints of the ordinary
moral norms. Though there are conflicts among the ordinary
moral beliefs, these conflicts cannot be resolved by
appealing to ordinary moral education. For such an
education does not and cannot explain the principles upon
which such beliefs are based. So, Socrates' first task is
to expose the conflicts, for he believes that elenchos can
help bring about a "coherent moral view" by correcting the
contradictory beliefs. So exposing the conflicts is not
sufficient. "The elenchos will work only if ordinary moral
beliefs are corrigible from within." That is, it will work
if the interlocutor is willing to revise his beliefs and
improve his views. By means of his new approach, Socrates
will get the interlocutor to see some general principles
about virtue, as a result of which the interlocutor will
have to adjust his other beliefs to suit the new principle.
The elenchos finds a conflict between (a) the interlocutors'
belief about what some virtue is; and (b) his beliefs about
28 Irwin [ 6 ]
,
p. 68.
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particular examples of that virtue; and (c) his beliefs
about the good. As a result of this conflict, the
interlocutor gives up some of (a). Irwin wrote,
Someone who can define a virtue has adjusted (a)
and (b) to (c)
.
He will therefore not be liable
to the doubt and confusion of the interlocutors
refuted in the elenchos. His beliefs will be
stable; and stability is recognized as one
condition for knowledge . 29
According to Irwin, the principles assumed true at the
outset of elenctic inquiry are not trivial; nor are they
arbitrary. The principles are needed "to produce a
coherent, rationally acceptable theory from elenctic
inquiry ." 30 On Irwin's view of the elenchos, if the
interlocutor sees that he has conflicting beliefs, he will
figure out how to decide which belief he should reject.
Socrates assumes that any rational person will agree that
virtue is good, and his interlocutor will accept that view,
and correct his beliefs accordingly.
In Irwin's analysis, "Socrates' moral principles and
his method of moral inquiry are inseparable ." 31 The
principles on which elenchos relies are required for the
constructive results. The principles themselves are
justified by the interlocutors' acceptance of them in the
‘ Irwin [ 6 ]
,
p . 62
.
30 Irwin [6] , p.70.
31 Irwin [ 6 ]
.
p. 71
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elenchos. Hence the method is powerful enough to defend the
principles
.
Irwin's depiction of Socrates and his powerful method
portrayed a man overconfident in his method, according to
Gerasimos Santas. He argued a few years after Irwin's
seminal work on Plato's moral theory that analyses such as
s give exaggerated importance to what Socrates knew
and to the efficacy of his method. Santas argued that
Socrates is actually trying to discover answers to some very
difficult and novel moral questions . 32 His main way of
discovering the answers is by examining the answers that
others give, which include some widely held beliefs of his
time. Santas argued that Socrates sometimes knows the
answers to the questions he is raising, and sometimes he
does not. The reason he refutes all the answers he gets may
be that all the answers he gets are inadequate: Some may be
wrong answers, some too narrow, and some contrary to what
Socrates believes. What his main line of elenchos does is
to test a belief or an answer by seeing what the belief
committed the believer to. Santas maintained, however,
"One's powers to see such commitments are always limited,
Socrates' powers only a bit less than most people's ." 33
Santas concluded that a man such as Socrates who takes so
much care to emphasize what one knows and what one does not
3: Santas
[ 1 ) , p. 71
.
33 Santas (1], p. 73 ff.
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know, would not claim to possess knowledge in advance of the
elenchos
.
By the time Vlastos published his revised view on
elenchos early 1980s, he had already been swayed by these
two accounts of a positive elenchos. He had read and
responded to the views of Irwin and Santas; though he agreed
with both conclusions that elenchos is on the whole, a
constructive device that Socrates employs, he came up with
what he dubbed a more "defensible" account of the method of
Socrates than either Irwin or Santas had presented.
CHAPTER 3
THE THREE AGES OF ELENCHOS IN VLASTOS
The Impotent Elenchos: 1956
In his Introduction to Protagoras, Vlastos argued as
many others before him, 1 and claimed that Socrates' method,
due to its peculiar nature, is incapable of justifying any
affirmative judgement. "Almost everything Socrates says is
wiry argument," he wrote. 2 However, despite the uncertain
results of his wiry arguments, Socrates was "perfectly clear
about the (far more important fact) that his method neither
assumes nor affords certainty about the truth or falsehood
of any one proposition." 3 Why? Because, Vlastos argued,
Socrates really does not know; he only investigates.
An investigative method's aim cannot be final
demonstrative certainty, according to Vlastos. Its practice
is compatible with suspended judgement as to the material
truth of its conclusions. In making such claims, Vlastos
was taking Socrates at his word, and relying on texts in
which Socrates insists that he does not have the answers to
the questions he raises, (cf. Ch. 165b, 166c; Pr. 348c.)
"Had Socrates thought of his method as aiming at a certain
See my Chapter 2
.
: Vlastos [13], p.xxxi.
3 Vlastos [13], p.xxx.
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demonstration of particular truths," Vlastos concluded, "he
would not have talked this way." 4
Originally, Vlastos thought that Socrates would not
have struck mechanically to a single pattern of argument,
for "logical pedantry is excluded by the spontaneity of a
live discussion." 5 However, Vlastos argued that all
elenctic arguments are the same in one respect6 : the
contradictory of some proposition, p, is deduced from one or
more propositions other than p. (In this respect, Vlastos'
depiction of elenchos agreed with what Robinson dubbed as
the "direct elenchos."
7
) He explained p as being a premise
"which seems true at first sight and is pronounced 'true'
right off by the inter locutor . "* On this view, Socrates
usually starts his elenchos by asking: 'p or not-p?' If the
interlocutor says p, Socrates proceeds with his argument in
the following manner with each premise being secured by the
agreement of the interlocutor. According to Vlastos,
Socrates argues the following way:
1. p implies g, and q implies r.
4 Vlastos [13], p.xxx.
5 Vlastos [13], p.xxviii, fn.13.
6 In 1956, Vlastos was sure that no two elenchoi follow the same
form (cf. p.xxvii) or logical pattern. Changing his mind, in 1983 he
claimed that there was a "standard" elenchos that can be found in most
of the elenctic dialogues, especially in the Gorgias . See my Chapter 1
for the chronology of the dialogues.
7 See my Chapter 2. In "indirect elenchos" falsehood follows from
the refutand without the aid of extra premise (s).
8 Vlastos [13], p.xxvii.
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2. s implies t.
3. t implies not-r
.
4. But not-r implies not-q
,
which implies not-p.
5. Therefore, t implies not-p.
6. Therefore, s implies not-p.
7. s
8. Therefore, not-p. 9
Vlastos argued that the conclusion of this argument,
not-p, could never amount to the proof that the refutand, p
is false unless its contradictory is deduced from no other
premise than p itself. According to Vlastos, this never
happens in the elenctic dialogues, so the only result is the
demonstration of the incompatibility of p with the other
propositions that figured as premises in the argument. 10
This too is "a long way short of proving that p is false,"
Vlastos wrote. Socrates can only be certain that p is false
if he is certain that the additional premises are true.
The outcome of the elenctic argument is to force the
interlocutor to make a choice between p and the premise (s)
from which not-p was deduced. The essential accomplishment
of the Socratic method, then, is the contradiction created
by the assertion of p together with other premises; but it
is left open whether not-p is true.
So, early in his career, Vlastos evaluated the Socratic
method on the assumption that Socrates has no interest in
showing his interlocutors that what they maintain is false.
q Reconstructed from Vlastos's own, [13], p.xxvi.
10 Vlastos [13], p.xviii.
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All Socrates is doing is investigating with his
interlocutors how what they believe is related to a number
of other beliefs, so that they can see for themselves what
commitments they are making, if they accept the truth of
their main premise. Whatever decision they make is theirs.
He can't make it for them, for he does not know; he only
inquires
.
Almost 30 years later, Vlastos took back most
everything he said was true about the Socratic method. He
now claimed that Socrates could prove, with his infallible
method, the truth of not-p, because elenchos is a tool not
only for investigation but also for acquiring knowledge.
The Potent Elenchos: 1983
By Vlastos' own admission, Irwin's work on the positive
nature of elenchos was responsible for the about-face in his
thinking. 11 In his now classic piece, Vlastos wrote that he
had been wrong in thinking that the Socratic elenchos has a
function only to expose the conflicts in the thinking of his
interlocutors. "I guessed wrongly twenty-five years ago in
the account of the elenchus I put into my Introduction to
the Protagoras ," he wrote. "So have others before or
since." 12 He said that he now saw what he had missed
earlier: Although Socratic elenchos fails to have final
demonstrative certainty, it does not follow from that that
11 vlastos [3], p.9-11; cf. Irwin [6). See my Chapter 2.
12 Vlastos [7a], p.28.
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this method has no other kind of certainty, or that elenchos
is compatible only with suspended judgement. Elenchos could
be shown to have a definite epistemological function. The
"standard elenchus," 13 as Vlastos now dubbed it, can not
only reveal, on a regular basis, contradictory beliefs, but
it can also "establish substantive doctrines of his own." 14
According to Vlastos' new conception, the standard
elenchos had the following components:
(1) The interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, which
Socrates considers false and targets for
refutation.
(2) Socrates secures the agreement to further premises, q
and r.
(3) Socrates argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q
and r entail not-p.
(4) Socrates claims to have shown that not-p is true, and p
false
.
Earlier in his career, Vlastos had argued that Socrates
never meant to go beyond the point (3) in his elenchos. 15
As we have seen, a great many scholars had maintained the
same 16 : that the Socratic method is inherently non-
constructive, it merely points out a conflict that may arise
from holding certain beliefs together. Elenchos thus aimed
13 Vlastos [7a], p.38, fn.29.
14 Vlastos [7a], p.38. Some of them are: the just man will not harm
his enemies ( R . 335); to teach men justice is to make them just (G.
460a); it is better to suffer deserved punishment than escape it (G.
494e )
,
etc
.
15 Vlastos [7a], p.40 ff. for his discussion of how he differs from
Grote and Zeller, who both claimed that elenchos stops at (3).
16 See my Chapter 2
.
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at putting respondents to shame by refuting these
conflicting beliefs the interlocutors are supposed to live
by and the very principles they claim to know. it can
provide no substantive views of how such knowledge can be
acquired. Now, Vlastos argued, the proposition p in point
(1) must be abandoned, because it has been refuted, and in
(4) its negation has been established. Thus that not-p is
true is the true outcome of elenchos.
Vlastos was now faced with the challenge of justifying
this assertion. How can Socrates can claim, as Vlastos
states Socrates does, to have proved that p is false, when
all he has established is the inconsistency of p with the
other premises? Nothing in the standard elenchos, taken by
itself, would ever justify point (4), that not-p is true and
p is false. In other words, how can the components of
elenchos, (1), (2) and (3) taken together guarantee the
result, point (4)? This was what Vlastos called "the
problem of elenchos." He described the problem as "how is
it that Socrates claims to have proved a thesis false, when
in point of logic, all he has proved is that the thesis is
inconsistent" with the premises whose truth he has not
undertaken to establish in that argument. 17
Before we turn to how he resolves the problem of
elenchos, let me say a little about the conditions under
which Vlastos claims the standard elenchos is conducted.
17 Vlastos [1], p.21, cf. [7a].
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The elenchos starts when an interlocutor makes some moral
claim that Socrates has been searching for, and wishes to
examine. What is Socrates searching for? Vlastos suggests,
For truth, certainly, but not for every sort of truth
—
only for truth in the moral domain. If we wanted to
know what is the wholesale price of olive oil on the
Peiraeus market, Socrates would not propose that
elenctic argument is the way to find out. 18
Nor is it the way to find out truth in mathematics or
metaphysics; Socrates keeps examinations to questions about
morality. 'Moral' issues are those about how one ought to
live, what sort of man one should be, how one gets to be
virtuous, and so on. Socrates, in the words of Vlastos, is a
"street evangelist," who wishes to conduct a joint search
with anyone who is willing to talk and reason with him on
these matters—as long as they participate honestly.
So, on Vlastos' view, Socrates imposes certain
constraints on his interlocutors for elenchos to succeed:
(1) They must abstain from speechifying. 19 Admitting that
he cannot handle long speeches, Socrates asks his
respondents be prepared to cut their answers short. (Pr.
3 3 5a2
-4
,
cf. 329b, 336b.) And (2) they must say what they
believe personally, what Vlastos dubbed as the "say what you
believe" rule. (cf. Cr. 40c-d; Pr. 331c; R. 337c, 346a,
350a; G. 495a, 500b.) Socrates honors all opinions, whether
it is of the wise or the many, as long as the interlocutor
18 Vlastos [7a], p.32.
This is only an ostensible requirement, see my Chapter 5.19
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believes that view, and does not answer contrary to his real
opinion [para doxan]
.
20
( R . 346a; 337c; Cr. 47a, 47d, 49c-d;
Eud. 286d ; G. 500b.)
Keeping these constraints in mind, we can now go back
to the puzzle of elenchos. The "crucial text" which Vlastos
says forced him to abandon his earlier position—and argue
for his strong conclusion in the standard elenchos— is in
the Gorgias
,
in particular, in an elenchos against Polus. 21
Here is that standard elenchos, drawn up by Vlastos:
(1) Polus believes that p: to commit injustice is better
than to suffer it. Socrates considers p false and
targets it for refutation.
(2) Socrates secures the agreement to further premise, q:
to commit injustice is baser than to suffer it.
[Socrates also secures Polus' agreement to a host of
other premises, which Vlastos bundles up as conjunct r
whose contents he takes to be irrelevant here.]
(3) Socrates gets Polus to agree that q and r entail what
Socrates takes to be the logical contradiction of
Polus' thesis, not-p, to suffer injustice is better
than to commit it.
(4) Socrates claims to have shown that not-p is true, and p
is false.
Here Vlastos thinks that what Socrates claims is that p
has been proved not just inconsistent with q and r, but
proved false. 22 This conclusion, according to Vlastos, is
Vlastos [7a], p.35.
21 See my Chapter 5 for an evaluation of this argument.
22 vlastos [7a], p.47, also fn.48. Interestingly, Vlastos
acknowledges that he sets aside questions relating to the logical
validity of this argument. He cites Santas [1] for authority that it
is. See my Chapter 5 for my argument that it is fallacious, and that
fallacy in elenchos may hold the key to assessing its results.
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supported by whet Socrates says in the text. The crucial
line is 479e5, where Socrates declares,
Has it not been proved that what was asserted [by
myself] is true? [oukun apodedeiktai hoti alethe
elegeto?] (trans. Vlastos) 23
Vlastos thinks that Socrates is making a perfectly
general claim here: Socrates can do the same in all of his
elenctic arguments. Socrates would not have made the claim
above that he has proved not-p true, unless he thought that
he could offer a compelling proof for the falsehood of p.
Socrates is convinced, Vlastos argues, that when he shows
his interlocutors that the negation of their thesis can be
derived from the conjunction of premises to which they have
agreed, they will never succeed in saving their thesis by
retracting conceded premises, q and r—as long as they hold
on to their original thesis, p.
Three decades earlier, Vlastos argued that elenchos
faced the interlocutor with making a choice between p and
other premises such as q and r. The case Vlastos is making
now is much stronger. No matter what premise they give up,
as long as the interlocutors hold on to p, they will always
be proven wrong because Socrates' will always find in the
interlocutor another set of beliefs which entails the
23 Alternative translations of the same passage pose conflicting
accounts of alethG, hence may underscore Vlastos' emphasis:
(1) "Hasn't it been proved that it was said truly?" (Irwin)
(2) "Hasn't it been proved that what was said is true?" (Zeyl)
(3) "Has it not been proved that this was a true statement?" (Lamb)
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negation of their original thesis. So, what changed between
1956 and 1983?
The answer rests in certain "meta-elenctic" 24
assumptions Socrates must be making, which Vlastos now
claims he overlooked. These assumptions not only supplement
the elenchos, but are necessary for its positive outcome.
These assumptions are not premisses in the argument, nor
does Socrates ever suggest that they are. But without them,
Socrates could not claim that he "proved" something. In
other words, Socrates would not be so confident about his
elenctic arguments unless he was making what Vlastos later
called the "tremendous assumption." 25
Assumption A
Anyone who ever has a false moral belief will always at
the same time have true beliefs entailing the negation
of that false belief.
Vlastos argues that Socrates himself must believe that
to prove the inconsistency of the thesis with the agreed-
upon premises is ipso facto to prove that, if the thesis is
false, no one can affirm it without generating contradiction
in his own system of beliefs. He also claims that
Assumption A is not an arbitrary assumption on the part of
Socrates. Vlastos writes,
Every time [Socrates] tangles with people who defend a
thesis he considers false and he looks for true
Vlastos [7a], p.53, fn.59.
Vlastos [3], p.114, fn.32.25
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premises among their own beliefs from which he candeduce its negation the needed premises are in place:
they are always where they should be if A is true. Sohe has this purely inductive evidence for the truth of
A . 26
Vlastos has one important qualifier for this tremendous
assumption. Assumption A is made in the Gorgias only; in
all of the earlier dialogues Socrates is free of it. 27 in
this particular dialogue, Socrates' language is much
stronger than earlier elenctic dialogues. In previous
dialogues Socrates describes the elenctic refutation of p by
saying that not-p "has become evident to us" [ephanfe hemin
(Pr. 353b5-6; Eu . 15cl-2; R. 335e5) ]
,
or the respondent now
"sees" [horas (Eu. Ila3)], or "knows" [iste (Pr. 3357cl)
]
that not-p. In the Gorgias, however, Socrates claims to
have "proved" 28 [ apodediktai ] that not-p.
Socrates is no epistemologist
,
according to Vlastos,
but Plato is. Socrates does not worry about the strength of
his claim for not-p. He never asks, as an epistemologist
would, why we must believe that those who disagree with
Socrates must have those entrenched beliefs which he can use
to make them "see" the falsehood of their misguided
26 Vlastos [7a] ,p.53.
21 Vlastos [7b], p.71.
28 Vlastos [7b], p . 72 : "When both kinds of language are used in
close juxtaposition, it does look as though 'not-p has been proved true'
means to go further in some unspecified, but important, way than does
'not-p has been made evident'."
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theses . 24 Plato, on the other hand, thinks elenchos is
hopeless without some very strong methodological
assumptions. It is in fact Plato who asks for reasons for
supposing that if Socrates thinks that his theses are
universally confirmed by elenchos, then he must think that
they are provable to everyone. If they are provable to
everyone, then everyone must have true beliefs which entail
the negation of each of his false beliefs. Thus, Vlastos
concludes that the tremendous assumption is "Plato's present
to his teacher, bestowed in the Gorgias where he is made to
say those very strong things. . . of which there is no hint
earlier on ." 30
The explanation for the change in Socrates' language in
the Gorgias, according to Vlastos, is closely related to
another meta-elenctic assumption Socrates is making. In
Vlastos's view, after years of searching, Socrates finds
that only his own system could survive the elenctic
challenge. Socrates' beliefs are "reassuringly consistent,"
according to Vlastos, because all others, when tested for
consistence, have failed. In all of the elenctic arguments
in which he has engaged Socrates has never been faulted for
inconsistency. So Socrates has evidence, as before,
inductive evidence, for another assumption.
Vlastos [7b] p.74.
30 Vlastos [7b], p.73.
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Assumption B
The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given
time is consistent.
Socrates does not say he knows that all his moral
beliefs are mutually consistent. But in Vlastos' analysis,
all Socrates needs to say, and he appears to do so, is that
he believes this is so. So long as consistency of the set
stands against all challenges, Socrates would be perfectly
justified in holding Assumption B, and hence in supposing,
in consequence of Assumption A, that his belief-set consists
entirely of true beliefs. According to Vlastos, from A and
B Socrates could infer with certainty that any set of moral
beliefs which was internally consistent would consist
exclusively of true beliefs. If it contained a false
belief, given Assumption A, it would also contain beliefs
entailing the negation of that belief. Hence, assumptions A
and B yield assumption C.
Assumption C
The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given
time is true.
So late in his career, Vlastos changed his evaluation
of the Socratic method, because he found that in the Gorgias
Socrates has a positive interest in showing his
interlocutors that what they maintain is false. In other
dialogues, all Socrates is doing is investigating with his
interlocutors how what they believe is related to other
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beliefs. The choice is up to them if they find that they
have conflicting beliefs, which belief to let go. But here
Socrates is showing that his interlocutors cannot maintain
the truth of their main premise, p. They have to give it
up. In effect, Socrates makes that decision for them by the
power of his elenchos. In the Gorgias
,
Socrates not only
investigates but he also knows.
One immediate question that came up after Vlastos'
article was published was whether or not elenchos, if it is
to yield positive results, requires these assumptions.
Couldn't Socrates establish not-p without assumptions A and
B? Richard Kraut thought Socrates could, for elenchos is
plenty powerful without them . 31 Kraut claimed that a proof
is possible without the methodological assumptions of A and
B. Vlastos argued that a proof rests on true premises, and
since Socrates regards his arguments as proofs, he must have
reasons, namely assumptions A and B, for the truth of the
premises. Kraut suggested that this reasoning is mistaken.
Citing Aristotle as authority on proof [ apodeiksis ] , Kraut
argued that in a proof it is not necessary to have reasons
for the truth of premises. First, the steps one can use in
a proof are not inexhaustible. So every proof contains a
finite number of premises. Second, in order to avoid
circularity, some of those premises will have to be
undemonstrated, hence are assumed true. "I take it that
31 Kraut [ 3 ]
.
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Professor Vlastos is not demanding that Socrates' arguments
do the impossible, " Kraut wrote, "that is prove not only
the conclusion but the premises as well." Socrates could
very well assume that some of his premises are true—as one
cannot always give reasons for everything one believes—but
"this fact does not deprive one of proof ." 32
Kraut's objection was that the force of the elenchos
rests on the reasonableness of the premises, and not whether
or not they are not widely shared. For Vlastos assumed
that without some contra-endoxic premises Socrates could not
arrive at contra-endoxic conclusions. These premises must
therefore be supported by some strong assumptions,
specifically, A and B . 33 But in Kraut's view, elenchos
could generate an unorthodox conclusion from a collection of
"humdrum" orthodoxies. For the only crucial criterion in
the elenchos is that the premises be plausible. Therefore,
assumptions A and B are not necessary for the success of
elenchos
.
What's more, Assumption B is not even true, Kraut
wrote. There is textual evidence that Socrates is genuinely
troubled by inconsistencies in his set 34 of beliefs. Kraut
3: Kraut [3] , p.62.
33 Vlastos [7a], p.43, fn.41.
34 Brickhouse & Smith also objected to Vlastos' notion of a
consistent set and argued that for a set of sentences to be consistent
it need not contain only true (or only false) sentences; it need only
contain sentences from which no contradiction can be derived without
employing some other sentence not included in the set. See Brickhouse &
Smith [ 5 ]
,
p. 190
.
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suggested that we take Socrates seriously when he confesses
his shortcomings in sorting out the perplexing conclusions
to some of the arguments he has raised. In fact, most early
dialogues end with genuine confession of such perplexity, he
argued. "Consistency is not quite so important for Socrates
as Professor Vlastos thinks it is," he wrote, and so Vlastos
is wrong in turning the Gorgias into an exception . 35
The emphasis Vlastos [and his critics such as Kraut]
placed on the logical and epistemological elements in
elenchos worried Charles Kahn, and other scholars . 36 Kahn
argued that the dramatic and personal nature of elenchos is
just as important as logic. Elenchos could yield positive
results without methodological assumptions and extensive
debate on whether or not it is a proof. It could do it by
silencing the interlocutor. Kahn's central thesis against
Vlastos was that all of the important elenchoi in the
Gorgias were ad hominem : directed against the man and not
his arguments . 37 On Kahn's account, the ad hominem nature
Kraut [3], p.70, cf. Protagoras, Apology, Hippias Minor.
Brickhouse and Smith [5] also favored taking Socrates at his word when
he claimed perplexity. Since Socrates claims that elenchos can be
practiced successfully by others (cf. Ap . 23c2-7; 39cl-d5), Brickhouse
and Smith argued that consistency of Socrates' beliefs is not necessary
for the success of elenchos as Vlastos claims, hence Assumption B is not
true
.
36 See for their respective emphases in elenchos, Kahn [2] for the
drama. King for psychology of the respondents, and Stokes [2] for the
characters of the interlocutors.
37 See Kahn [2], p.76 ff. also p.248-258 for his view that the
standard elenchos does not exist in all of the so-called elenctic
dialogues
.
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of the elenchos is therapeutic 31' in two important ways:
First, it helps the respondent rid himself of his emotions
and prejudices, and facilitates the process of acquiring
knowledge. And second, it helps the interlocutor see in
Socrates the paradigm of the good person. Kahn concluded
that it is the personal elements in elenchos that are
essential to its success more than the logical nature of its
structure
.
The Omnipotent Elenchos: 1991 and 1994
In a posthumously published and revised version of the
1983 article 39
,
Vlastos presents an improved and all
powerful elenchos: Socrates is able, by the power of
elenchos, to acquire moral knowledge. Vlastos goes even
further in his bold thesis and claims that it is only by
elenchos that Socrates can acquire this knowledge. The new
version of a seemingly omnipotent elenchos is due to two new
topics with which Vlastos was presently preoccupied:
Socratic disawoval of knowledge, 40 and Platonic interest in
geometry. These two issues played an important role in
Vlastos' second re-evaluation of the nature and function of
elenchos. The first I discuss in the next chapter. Now let
me say a few words about what Vlastos takes to be the role
38 Also see Seeskin [2] for a discussion on the therapeutic
influence of elenchos on the interlocutors.
39 Vlastos [1], p.1-37.
40 Vlastos (6), also in [1], p.39-66.
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of mathematical studies in Plato's thinking and the
"disappearance" of elenchos from the Platonic corpus after
the Gorgias.
After the Gorgias, which he takes to be the last in the
elenctic dialogues, Vlastos claims elenchos drops out of the
dialogues. The method of examining others turns into an
examination of Socratic hypotheses—this 'Socrates' being no
longer the historic man but Plato's mouthpiece . 41 Vlastos
argues that around the time he was writing the Gorgias,
Plato went through a profound change, and as he did,
elenchos dropped out of sight. What accounts for this
profound change? 42
Vlastos' answer is but a hypothesis: Plato's growing
interest in mathematics transformed his own outlook on the
method of philosophical argumentation. As Plato became
interested in geometry, he discarded the method that
Socrates held as the "arbiter of moral truth," because he no
longer believed it worked . 43 Vlastos gives historical
reasons in order to account for Plato's interest in this new
method. Citing works from the late fifth, and fourth
centuries, Vlastos argues that there was a growing interest
in developing axiom sets in classical antiguity, which was
41 See his "Ten Theses" in Vlastos [3], p.45-81.
42 Vlastos [3], p.117 ff.
43 Vlastos [3], p . 1 17 .
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fully completed by Euclid in his Elements
.
44 in Vlastos'
view, interest in mathematical knowledge could also be seen
in the middle period of Plato, even though his discussion is
notoriously unclear—even to specialists. Despite the
complications in the details of his geometrical definitions
and examples45
,
however, Plato's point was simple, according
to Vlastos: He wanted to show that the logical structure of
the new method is antithetical to that of the elenchos. The
Socratic elenchos could correct a mistake by eliminating a
false belief, p, when it is shown that p contradicts q,
which the interlocutor holds. Plato realized, however, that
although elenchos could correct mistakes in the moral domain
it could never do that in geometry, for a shortfall in
epistemic certainty is inherent in the elenctic method . 46
The knowledge that Socrates gathers in the elenchos does not
entail certainty, and may, therefore, be used to mean simply
justifiable true belief. The geometrical method, on the
other hand, is a model only for demonstration, one of
"investigating from hypothesis ." 47 To adopt this
methodological model for research in moral philosophy "is to
scuttle the elenchus," Vlastos argues, for the "say what you
44 See Vlastos [3], p.121, fn.63 on his views of the pioneering
ventures on geometrical elements, and fn.64 on the efforts to
systematize the partial theorems.
45 M. 76a4-7 ; La. 192b; cf. Elements I, Definition of 13 and 14.
46 See my next chapter for a fuller discussion of this point.
47 Vlastos [3], p.123.
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believe" rule of asserting premises that Vlastos took to be
essential to the elenchos would have to be foregone.
On Vlastos' hypothesis, Plato, unlike Socrates, took
geometric knowledge to be the paradigm of all knowledge,
including the knowledge of moral truths. In the geometric
model, in order to investigate a claim, p, one must start
with a hypothesis, h. This involves investigating the truth
of h such that p is true if and only if h is true. The
crucial question to be resolved in the geometrical model is,
what follows if h is true and if it is false? As the
geometrical method of investigation is applied by tying the
truth of p to that of h, one aims to demonstrate that p is
true because it is a necessary consequence of h. h may be
known to be true because it is a necessary consequence of
the axioms of the geometrical system. 4*
According to Vlastos, the Gorgias is the natural
turning point for Plato. For it is in this dialogue that
his contact with geometry first shows up: This is the first
time in the sequence of the Platonic dialogues, Vlastos
claims, that Socrates says he is speaking like a
geometrician . 49 However, it is in the Meno that Vlastos
first finds the full impact of Plato's new interest in
48 Vlastos [3], p.124.
49 Vlastos [3], p. 128, fn.87; cf. 465c, the proportions, as
cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistical to legal art, rhetoric to
justice, etc., is said in the style of geometricians [eipein hosper hoi
geometrai). The second reference to the geometricians, according to
Vlastos, is in the Meno, 76a4-7.
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mathematics on the content and method of philosophy. in
this dialogue, the interrogation of the slave-boy with
respect to a geometrical problem was always thought to be a
paradigm of the elenchos. The boy is asked to find the side
of a square which duplicates the area of a given square,
whose side is two-feet long. The boy guesses wrong twice,
and each time he is brought to understand that the false
answer, p, is eliminated because p contradicts g, and g is
what the answerer himself accepts as true. On Vlastos'
view, however, the elenchos in this dialogue is good only
for correcting the boy's mistake, and it does not bring him
to the true answer. "To bring him to it, Socrates must shed
the adversative role to which persistence in elenctic
argument would have kept him ." 50 Vlastos observes that
Socrates does indeed shed that role when he induces the boy
to "recollect " 51 the answer that the side of a square whose
area is twice that of a given square is the diagonal of the
given square.
What is new and non-Socratic here, according to
Vlastos, is the resort to geometrical method, which signals
a new paradigm for knowledge: Plato is not giving up moral
50 Vlastos [3], p.119.
51 Vlastos speculates that the doctrine of recollection is Plato's
answer to Socratic elenchos. For this doctrine—that every person's
soul existed long before birth and had prenatal knowledge about
everything, and that this knowledge is recoverable through recollection-
-explains Assumption A. The doctrine of recollection answers how it is
possible that every one of Socrates interlocutors had true beliefs in
their souls entailed by the negation of their false beliefs. See
Vlastos [ 1 ]
,
p. 29
.
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inquiry for mathematics, but instead he is finding a process
by which all inquiry must proceed. He leads Socrates out of
the elenchos into a new method that mathematicians practice.
Caught up in the Greek aspiration at the time for scientific
knowledge, Plato viewed mathematics, according to Vlastos,
as the foundation for a system in which every statement
justifiable by argument is derivable from secure premises,
and every conclusion is indubitable as it is drawn therefrom
by necessary inference. The results constitute necessary
statements which, as Aristotle later phrased it, "could not
be otherwise." It is no wonder, Vlastos argues, that Plato
saw the infallible method of Socratic elenchos as being
inadequate for such knowledge, and therefore he did away
with it in the later dialogues.
Vlastos maintains that Socrates in the early dialogues
has no notion of the theory of recollection, nor is he aware
of the geometrical method. Therefore, he thinks that true
belief without certainty suffices to guide action aright.
On the basis of his analysis of the role of the geometric
method in the Meno
,
however, Vlastos speculates that Plato's
interest in geometry eventually takes him to the doctrine of
the philosopher-king of the Republic and the view that the
masses should be spared the hazards of the elenchos.
Vlastos writes,
Access to the critical examination of questions of
good and evil, right and wrong, may then be
reasonably withheld from all but the elite, and
even from them until they have finished
mathematical studies
.
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I will not take up this fantastic account of the
intellectual development of Plato, as it falls beyond the
scope this project. Instead, I will now turn to Vlastos'
other claim that elenchos, infallible though it may be, i
the only method to acquire moral knowledge.
5: Vlastos [3], p.125.
CHAPTER 4
ELENCHOS AND MORAL KNOWLEDGE
Is Method All?
Vlastos ' treatment of the Socratic method, while
providing us with creative solutions to age-old dilemmas,
presents many new and intriguing puzzles. In the Gorgias
Socrates has some very strong moral doctrines. According to
Vlastos, Socrates establishes these doctrines by elenchos 1
and elenchos alone. In this chapter, I will be concerned
with a group of problems that arises from this claim. In
what follows I will first explain the thesis Vlastos argues
for, and why we should resist it. I will then present an
account of the role of certain religious beliefs in the
Gorgias and show that this presents a serious problem to
Vlastos' interpretation of elenchos as the method by which
Socrates obtains all his moral knowledge.
According to Vlastos' radical interpretation of the
Socratic method, elenchos is the foundation of Socratic
ethics. Vlastos' new subtitle for his now famous article
"The Socratic Elenchus," 2 sums up his view nicely: "Method
is All." 3 Vlastos' account of the elenchos gives Socrates a
1 See my Chapter 3 for Vlastos' description of elenchos. Briefly,
"elenchos" refers to an argument in which Socrates refutes an
interlocutor's thesis by deriving its denial from premises which that
interlocutor and Socrates agree to.
2 Vlastos [7a]; see my Chapter 3 for a summary.
3 Vlastos [1], p.1-37.
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highly dependable method to produce certain results at any
given time. Vlastos believes that elenchos is the only
method through which Socrates acquires moral knowledge.
Because it is the only means for knowledge in the moral
arena, Vlastos thinks that elenchos also provides the
persuasive force needed to exhort others to change their
mistaken moral beliefs. Central to this view is Vlastos'
thesis
,
T1 Elenchos is Socrates' sole access to moral knowledge.
4
Before we turn our attention to the problems arising
from this thesis, let us first understand its terms and its
scope. First, Vlastos argues that his thesis, Tl, is taken
to be true only in the Gorgias . s For Vlastos the Gorgias
contains the blueprint of the Socratic method. In this
dialogue, Vlastos argues, Socrates is able, by "iron and
adamant" elenchos, to "prove" that the moral beliefs of
Gorgias, Polus and Callicles are false. 6 Accordingly,
Vlastos thinks that the Gorgias is witness to the triumph of
Socrates and the true method of moral philosophy. And it is
here, he contends, that we truly come to understand the
4 Vlastos [1], p.61, fn.50. Similarly, "Knowledge [is] reached and
tested through ... elenchus , " Vlastos [1], p.55.
5
"Postscript to 'The Socratic Elenchus'," Vlastos [1], p.33-37.
From now on, all my references to Plato's text are to the Gorgias. See
my Chapter 1 for the chronology of the elenctic dialogues that Vlastos
accepts
.
6 Vlastos [1], p.33-34.
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nature of Socrates' method and so understand Socrates as a
philosopher . 7
Also crucial to Vlastos' thesis is what he thinks
Socrates does in an elenchos. He establishes truth, but
truth only in the moral domain. Vlastos says,
There is no reason to suppose that Socrates thinks
that truths in the domain of the productive crafts
or of mathematics or of logic are to be
ascertained by elenctic argument . 8
Vlastos believes that Socrates is "a moralist pure and
simple." In all the dialogues prior to the Meno
,
Vlastos
holds that Socrates exhibits "epistemological innocence,
methodological naivety ," 9 and practices only moral
inquiry . 10 He has no epistemological worries about his own
method, and so he never inquires into moral theory . 11 Nor
does he appeal to any meta-elenctic premises to arrive at
his conclusions in an elenctic argument . 12 In Vlastos'
view, one of the most important functions of elenchos is to
examine "not just propositions but lives ." 13 This is the
7 See my Chapter 1 on Vlastos' claim that Socrates in the Gorglas
represents the views of the real Socrates, not of Plato.
8 Vlastos [1], p.5. Vlastos believes that the method of
mathematical discovery employed in the cross-examination of the slave-
boy in the Meno is not elenctic but maieutic.
9 Vlastos [ 1 ] , p. 25
.
10 Vlastos [ 1 ] , p. 6
.
11 Vlastos [1], p.63.
12 Vlastos [1], p.25; cf. p.4-9.
13 Vlastos [1], p.8-9.
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existential dimension" of elenchos, which requires that the
elenctic arqument be based on premises which reflect the
actual moral beliefs of the interlocutors.
The word "moral" covers a wide range as it is used by
Vlastos in his thesis, T1—so wide in fact that what we
might ordinarily consider as non-moral are considered as
moral premises by Socrates. 14 Though he does not have a
special word for it himself, Socrates understands by
"moral," according to Vlastos, all that pertains to how one
ought to live, what sort of person one should be, and who is
happy and who is not. 15 Included in this vast realm are the
notoriously problematic notion of arete, and of course, the
individual moral virtues. 16 On Vlastos' account, Socrates
examines by elenchos questions that fall in this vast domain
as if they have never been examined before. By the right
method of moral philosophy, according to Vlastos, Socrates
is able to determine if a person is living the right sort of
life, if he is the right sort of person, and if he is truly
happy or not.
Let me also clarify the notion of knowledge in Vlastos'
thesis, for the paradox is plain: Given his frequent
14 Such as a crucial premise, "all things are called beautiful
either on account of the pleasure they give or their usefulness." (474e)
15 Vlastos (1), p . 7 ; cf. G. 500c3-4; 487e-488a; 472c-d.
16 Such as courage, moderation, justice., piety, etc., investigation
into the nature of which constitute the thematic core of the elenctic
dialogues
.
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disclaimers to any sort of knowledge, how can Vlastos claim
that Socrates has positive moral knowledge? To this obvious
question, Vlastos has a surprising and yet obvious answer:
Socrates makes a dual use of his words for knowing. Vlastos
thinks that this dual use signals, "two radically different
cognitive achievements," one of which Socrates disavows,
while the other he avows . 17 In Vlastos / view, Socrates is
not an epistemologist
,
and so he is not interested in the
necessary and sufficient conditions for "infallible"
knowledge. 18 When Socrates disavows knowledge, as he so
often does, he disavows knowledge that one has the utmost
certainty of being true. This knowledge is in a strong
sense certain knowledge, which is in Vlastos' technical
terminology, "knowledger . " On Vlastos' view, Socrates does
not expect his moral knowledge to meet "the fantastically
strong standards" of knowledger , because presumably Socrates
realizes that his method of philosophy is inadequate for
acquiring this kind of knowledge. What Socrates does avow,
in Vlastos' judgement, at least in the Gorgias
,
is moral
knowledge that he acquires "by his own maverick method of
philosophical inquiry, the elenchus ." 19 This knowledge is
17 Vlastos [1], p.62. For the original article, "The Socratic
Disavowal" see Vlastos [6].
18 See for sufficient conditions for infallible knowledge, Vlastos
[1], p.52-55; especially fn.31. Briefly, if p is infallibly known, then
necessarily p is true. For Plato as well as for Aristotle, this is
demonstrated by premises which guarantee p's truth.
19 Vlastos [1], p.49.
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in a weak sense elenctic knowledge, which is in Vlastos'
technical terminology, "knowledge E . " So according to
Vlastos, when Socrates avows any knowledge in the moral
domain, the content of that knowledge is propositions that
Socrates thinks "elenctically justifiable." 20 it follows
that on Vlastos' account "to know" refers directly to what
Socrates seeks to and does achieve by elenctic inquiry; that
is, Socrates knows only what he can establish by elenchos.
A virtue of Vlastos' distinction between knowledge,- and
knowledge E is that it saves Socrates from charges of
confusion and inconsistency. This distinction nicely does
away with the apparent discrepancy, when, for example,
Socrates says in the Gorgias that he does not know if the
theses he proved are true, even after he proved them (508e6-
509a5 ) . In Vlastos' reading, all Socrates means here is
that he has knowledge E , but not knowledge,.. Socrates does
not know for certain that they are true, but he does know
that they are elenctically justified. "Thus his avowal of
ignorance ... never generate [s] practical inconsistency or
doctrinal incoherence." 21 So when Vlastos claims that
elenchos is Socrates' sole access to moral knowledge, we
should understand by it "knowledge E "
We have now roughly examined all the terms except
'elenchos' in Vlastos' thesis. Let us now briefly review
20 Vlastos [1], p.56.
21 Vlastos [1], p.60.
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Vlastos ' account of a standard elenchos. 22 There are four
characteristic components in a standard elenchos, and ( 4 ) is
the point of controversy in the history of the treatment of
elenchos. 23
(1) The interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, whichSocrates considers false and targets for
refutation.
(2) Socrates secures the agreement to further premises, 24 q& r. (g & r are not argued for, but accepted by the
interlocutor and Socrates.)
(3) Socrates argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that g &
r entail not-p.
(4) Socrates claims to have shown that not-p is true, and d
false. F
Vlastos thinks that elenchos is a multifaceted
activity, which may take a number of different routes. So,
Vlastos thinks that it cannot be depicted by a single form
of argument. 25 However, in trying to get clear on the
crucial point of how not-p is generated, several competing
" See my Chapter 3 for more detail.
23 See my Chapter 2
.
24 Vlastos exaggerates the frequency of such agreements, and
overlooks the cases in which Socrates obtains ostensible agreements,
e.g. "I'm going along with you both to expedite your argument and
gratify Gorgias." (501cl0, cf.516b4.) Sometimes he gains no acceptance
at all. At the end of the Gorgias Socrates is reduced to conducting
elenchos by himself, for no interlocutor accepts any premise he puts
forward. See Polus' responses in 470bl0, 4803, Callicles in 495b; 504b;
505c-d ; 506c; 513c; 519d; 522e.
25 Vlastos [1], p.ll. Although Vlastos considers an attempt to
assign a distinct form to elenctic argument as being incongruous to the
Socratic spirit of spontaneous debate, his account leaves us in the dark
as to exactly how to delineate, enumerate and differentiate elenctic
from other kinds of arguments. This in turn seriously hampers a proper
evaluation of elenctic arguments.
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patterns of elenchos have been suggested. 26 Vlastos thinks
that elenctic premises are propositions other than the
proposition under investigation, p. If Socrates had to use
as a premise the proposition under investigation, according
to Vlastos, Socrates would have to worry about the truth of
the whole of the premise set. Since he is not worried about
any such thing, so Vlastos argues, the standard elenchos
must have the form of argument in which not-p is generated
from premises other than p. 27 So taking Vlastos'
recommendation, we may characterize28 the standard elenchos
as follows:
1 . q & r
2 . If q & r, then not-p
3 . therefore, not
-P
See Robinson [1], p.22 ff. According to Robinson, the type of
elenchos that is most frequent in the early dialogues is "indirect"
elenchos, which employs the main thesis under examination, p, as a
premise in the argument, not-p is generated from assuming the truth of p
together with some other premises, q and r. So, when Socrates gets his
interlocutor to agree to the claims, q and r, he suggests that q and r
entail not-p. Vlastos argues that Socrates' positive doctrines are
established only by standard elenchos, in which the truth of the
refutand is never assumed in the argument. See Vlastos [1], p.12, p.35.
Vlastos rightly points out that Robinson fails to give references
to identify the "indirect" elenchoi in the texts, and so it is
impossible to assess his claim fully. However, Vlastos' account does
not take us any further either. See my footnotes 28 and 29.
27 Vlastos [7a], p.39.
28 Also unclear in Vlastos' account is if we should take his
characterization to represent the prototype of elenchos. For the
syllogisms of Socratic elenchos fall into many types. As Robinson
briefly discusses, for some of them we can easily find names and forms
from the textbooks of logic. But for many more there are no obvious
names, or forms, a point which Vlastos neglects to mention. See
Robinson [ 1 ] .
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There is a particular argument29 that Vlastos takes as
his guide to his exegesis of the standard elenchos. It is
the notorious argument of Socrates against Polus. (I
evaluate this argument in some detail in my Chapter 5, and
so for now I will follow Vlastos' interpretation.) in this
example, Socrates is said to be trying to show Polus the
falsehood of p by defending, according to Vlastos, what
Socrates takes to be its "logical contradictory," not-p.
The argument is prompted by a discussion in which Polus
maintains, and he says everyone else does also
p To do injustice is better then to suffer it.
Socrates says Polus is wrong, and so is everyone else.
Socrates believes, and he says everyone else does too once
they see their mistaken belief
not-p To suffer injustice is better than to do it.
Polus is indignant. He cannot believe this view can be
seriously maintained. But arguing in an elenctic fashion
Socrates gets Polus to agree to g.
29 This is Vlastos' only working example for the operation of
elenchos in the Gorgias . The dearth of examples from a dialogue
purported to be fraught with elenctic activity greatly undercuts
Vlastos' strong claim of the indubitable success of elenchos.
30 Vlastos [1], p . 19 . Clearly, p and not-p as stated by Vlastos are
not "logical" contradictories. It is puzzling why Vlastos would think
they are. All Socrates is entitled to say here is that these two
statements are, in some informal sense, contraries. They cannot both be
true, but they can both be false.
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g To do injustice is more disgraceful 31 than to
suffer it.
Socrates also gets him to agree to r and other premises,
whose contents Vlastos leaves out for the moment. 32
Socrates gets Polus to agree that q and r entail not-p. So
following Vlastos' blueprint of standard elenchos, we can
characterize this particular elenchos, in its most
skeletal 33 form, as follows:
1. To do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer it.
2. If to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer
it, then to suffer injustice is better than to do it.
3. Therefore, to suffer injustice is better than to do it.
Here Socrates is not really entitled to say that he has
proved that not-p, to suffer injustice is better than to do
it. But, Vlastos claims that "Socrates feels empowered to
tell Polus . . . that his own thesis, not-p
,
has been proved
true." 34 Why does Vlastos "believe" Socrates when all
Socrates is entitled to say that he has established the
inconsistency of p with premises q and r, whose truth he has
not established in the argument? Because Socrates thinks
that q and r are true. In Vlastos' view, Socrates
31
aischion, also translated as 'base', 'ugly' or 'shameful'. For an
excellent discussion of the terms in this argument, see Adkins, p.153-168.
32 Vlastos [1], p.20. For the content of r see my Chapter 5.
33 The argument is in fact much more complicated than this little
extract does justice to. But the point of discussion is the status of the
premises, so I will save discussion of the real argument until Chapter 5.
34 Vlastos [1], p . 2 0 ; cf. [3], Chapter 5.
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establishes not-p, because "not-p follows from premises
which are true, [which] is to prove not-p true ." 35
Let us start assessing the merits of Vlastos' claim by
discussing first what is left out in his account of the
elenchos. Pointing out what his claim omits is as important
as pointing out what it contains, for such an incomplete
treatment obstructs a full view of what elenchos can and
does establish. First, Vlastos does not address whether or
not all the premises Socrates uses in his elenctic arguments
express moral beliefs. Given his implicit restrictions of
the content of the premises in an elenctic argument, as I
have discussed above, it is safe to assume that Vlastos
thinks that all elenctic premises express moral beliefs . 36
Accordingly, he seems to think that the moral conclusions of
the elenchos are not derived from non-moral premises . 37
However, in the Gorgias many crucial premises in arguments
which Vlastos would accept as elenctic cannot, on face
value, be categorized as moral propositions . 38 If such
premises are included in Socrates' set of moral beliefs,
however, then Vlastos must to do two things: Either he must
Vlastos [1], p.28; cf. p.36, fn.16.
36 See Vlastos [1], p.69, fn.7; p.5-6; p.56-58.
37 See for an objection to this view, Polansky, and Kraut [3].
38 For example, "If somebody acts upon something there is necessarily
also something that has something done to it by the one acting upon it."
( 476b5
)
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give up his frequently stated claim that Socrates is a
philosopher concerned only with moral propositions or he
must answer the difficult question of how moral conclusions
can be derived from nonmoral premises. He does neither.
The closest Vlastos comes to addressing a point remotely
relevant is when he disavows in a brief footnote his earlier
claim that Socrates needs non-endoxic premises in deducing
contra-endoxic conclusions . 39 Whether it is possible to
derive normative conclusions from factual claims is, of
course, a worry that occupies many contemporary ethicists.
In all fairness to Vlastos, this point appears to be
undecidable by textual evidence, at least in the Gorgias.
Given the importance he assigns to elenchos in moral
philosophy, however, Vlastos should nevertheless consider
the implications of such a possibility for his account of
elenchos. Moreover, according to his thesis, Tl, it is
clear that Vlastos leaves out any possibility that Socrates
can obtain some of his premises nonelenctically . As I will
discuss shortly, however, there is evidence, at least in the
Gorgias, that this is not the case. Finally, Vlastos leaves
out all questions relating to the logical validity of
inferring not-p from q and r, and assumes that not-p is
validly deduced . 40 He holds that Socrates knows that the
39 Vlastos [1], p.16, fn.45.
40 Vlastos [1], p.20, fn.60; he leaves the task to Santas [1], who
amazingly finds no invalidity in Socratic arguments.
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conclusion, validly deduced, is true. 41 This leaves him
only with the task of providing a plausible answer to the
question why Socrates thinks his premises such as g and r
are true.
Vlastos grants that g & r are "moral beliefs" 42 which
guide the Socratic elenctic process. Socrates has a whole
host of them in the Gorgias . For example, Socrates
expresses, among others, the following beliefs. Note that
B1-B10 are not unlike g or r.
B1 Happiness is determined entirely by education
[paideias] and justice [dikaiosunfes]
. . . The admirable
and good [kalon k'agathon] man or woman is happy
[eudaimona], the unjust and wicked are unhappy. (470e6)
B2 The happiest man is one who has no evil in his soul...
And second [happiest] is the man who gets rid of it...
This is the man who gets punished. (478d-e)
B3 Not paying what's due when one has committed
injustice is naturally the most serious and
foremost evil of all. (479d5)
B4 Punishment gets rid of [apallage] evil in the
soul. (479d)
B5 Of all evils, the ultimate is that of arriving in
Hades with one's soul stuffed full of unjust
actions. (522e)
B6 The unjust man [adikos] is thoroughly miserable [pantos
athlios]
,
and more miserable if he doesn't pay justice
[didd diken] and suffer what's due [tuchane timdrias],
but less miserable if he pays justice and suffers
what's due at the hands of both gods and men. (472e5)
Vlastos [ 1 ] , p. 45 .
42 Vlastos sometimes calls them "theses," and sometimes "beliefs." I
will call all such theses "beliefs. See Vlastos [1], p.35-36. Though I
can only scratch the surface of the complexities of the issue, the
notion of belief, I take it, involves this: If Socrates believes that p,
he takes it that p is true.
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B7 A soul is good if it gets to have organization
[taxis] and order [kosmos]
.
(504b5)
B8 An orderly soul [psuchfe kosmon] is a self-
controlled one [sophron]. (506e5)
B9 The orderly people [tous kosmous] are happier than the
licentious [tdn akolastOn]
.
(493d2-4)
BIO It is necessarily very much the case [polle ananke]
that the self-controlled man, because he is just and
brave and pious, is a completely good man [agathon],
that the good man does well and admirable whatever he
does, and that the man who does well is blessed and
happy [makarion and eudaimona]. ( 507b8-508c5)
How is a belief such as B4
,
or B9 actually arrived at
and defended? If we take Vlastos thesis T1 to mean that
elenchos is Socrates' only source of moral knowledge, such
beliefs must also have been obtained by an elenchos. That
is, B4
,
etc., must be a conclusion of a previous elenchos,
for example, which Socrates now uses as a premise in his
elenchos against Polus. So the previous elenchos must also
have premises obtained by another elenchos and so on.
Strictly speaking, then, T1 generates a regression, a
problem to which I will return shortly. There is no
evidence, however, at least in the Gorgias
,
that these
beliefs are all established by elenchoi. That is, there is
not necessarily an elenchos in sight every time Socrates
propounds one of these strong moral claims. 43 In point of
fact, Socrates uses his moral beliefs such as B1-B10
sometimes as premises, and sometimes he merely asserts them.
43 Neither can elenchos as understood by Vlastos be found throughout
the dialogue. See Kahn [1], p.233-258 for a detailed discussion of this
point
.
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Sometimes they appear to be impressive conclusions of very
unimpressive arguments. So how does Vlastos support his
thesis?
Vlastos defends his thesis by claiming that elenctic
knowledge is derived inductively from the repeated and
successful elenctic experience of Socrates. That is, we
need not attribute to Socrates, Vlastos claims, the view
that his individual elenctic arguments are used to establish
these theses. On Vlastos' view, what Socrates knows is not
a collection of individual items of knowledge, each of which
is a conclusion established by a previous elenchos. Rather,
Vlastos wants to argue that Socrates uses his beliefs, g or
r or B1-B10
,
as starting points in his elenchos, because he
has a belief-set which consists entirely of true beliefs.
Socrates infers the consistency of the set from the track-
record in his own experience. 44 All others, when tested for
consistency, have failed. Apparently, conducting elenchos
year after year, Socrates comes to see, with fantastic
regularity, that he can always find beliefs in their belief
system which entail the negation of their thesis. (This is
why Polus could not prevent not-p from being deduced from q
& r by giving up, say, g. Vlastos' Socrates could start all
over again and find other premises inside Polus' belief
system to negate the trouble belief, p. 4S ) He has inductive
44 Vlastos [1], p.27, fn.69.
45 Vlastos
[ 1 ) , p. 22 .
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evidence that his own elenctically tested moral beliefs are
at any time consistent. So long as consistency stands as
proof against challenges, Vlastos argues, Socrates is
justified in holding that his belief set consists entirely
beliefs. For that reason, Vlastos argues,
Socrates is confident that any belief he uses in any
elenchos will be universally certifiable by the elenctic
method to anyone . 47
We do not, of course, know whether the historical
Socrates had actually claimed the kind of confidence Vlastos
assigns him. The early dialogues show that he did not.
Socrates does not talk like a person who believes that he
has only true beliefs at any given time. Scholars rightly
note that Vlastos' claim undermines the very core of the
Socratic practice in the early dialogues, namely, aporia.
Curiously, Vlastos makes little mention of aporia either in
the Platonic corpus or specifically in the Gorgias . 4*
Although he talks a tough game here, Socrates on several
46 Vlastos [1] , p. 28 .
47 Assumption [A]: Whoever has a false moral belief will always have
at the same time true beliefs entailing the negation of that false
belief
.
Assumption [B]: The set of elenctically tested moral beliefs held
by Socrates is consistent.
Assumption [ C ]
:
Therefore, the set of moral beliefs held by
Socrates at any time is true.
See Vlastos [7a]. Although Vlastos dropped Assumption [C] in his
[1], it is there in spirit.
Matthews [1], p.3 ff. for criticism of Vlastos [3]. Why the
Gorgias displays few of the philosophical perplexity of the earlier ones
is of course the controversy here.
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occasions expresses reservations about his own elenctic
accomplishments. As Benson amply documents, there are
passages, which, borrowing Benson's terminology, dilute the
strength of elenchos. 49 For example, Socrates, upon
completion of many elenchoi, assesses his predicament with
the following or similar words, "If these things are true,"
or "so at least it appears from the argument." Immediately
after he claims to have "proved," for instance, the unjust
person is most miserable unless he is punished, he says, "I
don't know how these things are." (480al-2; 479c4-5; 480b2-
5; 509a2-bl
. )
50
If Socrates is not as confident in his method as
Vlastos would have us believe, where does he find positive
support for his premises? And, if he has to consider every
moral belief guestionable
,
doesn't the elenchos generate an
infinite regression? Vlastos presents a curious category to
block the objection. According to Vlastos, Socrates does
not consider every moral belief questionable until they have
been subjected to elenctic testing. 51 Socrates accepts what
Vlastos takes to be "utterly uncontroversial
"
propositions
which his fellow citizens take as moral knowledge, and uses
them as premises in elenctic argument. According to
4Q Benson [1], Section 2.4.7.
50 Although Vlastos attempts to explain away this perplexity by his
distinction of knowledge,-- and knowledge E , there is nothing in the text
that warrants such a distinction.
51 Vlastos [1], p.138.
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Vlastos, these are propositions such as "temperance is a
virtue," "virtue is good," or "justice is a virtue," which
are neither self-evidently true nor undoubtable. The
crucial point, according to Vlastos, is that they are truly
held by the interlocutor. 5 - If they survive the elenctic
testing, Vlastos argues, they will be added as elenctic
knowledge to Socrates' depository of moral doctrines.
I do not see how the enigmatic category of "presumptive
elenctic knowledge" helps Vlastos defend his thesis for the
Gorgias. Surprisingly, in his explication of this category,
Vlastos does not use a single example from the Gorgias. In
fact, he only uses one such moral commonplace proposed by
Laches (La. 190e) However, presumptive elenctic knowledge
is an important criterion for our understanding of the
nature of the premises of the elenchos. It is unfortunate
that Vlastos fails to show examples from the dialogue that
is, according to him, the paradigm of elenchos. It is also
unclear whether the propositions mentioned by Vlastos are
indeed moral commonplaces, or whether they are utterly
uncontroversial. One could find in studies of Greek popular
morality in the age of Plato examples to the contrary. 53
Furthermore, I will discuss shortly that some of Socrates'
5
- In 1983 Vlastos claimed that Socrates requires non-endoxic
premises to reach contra-endoxic conclusions. Various critics have
objected, and Vlastos renounced this claim altogether. See Vlastos [1],
p. 16 , fn. 45.
53 Dover [1], especially p.69-73, and p.226-242. Also see Adkins,
p. 172-189. Also see C.C.W. Taylor [2], p.233 ff.
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beliefs that are employed as premises in the elenchos are
themselves utterly controversial and not at all commonplace.
Why else would Polus so frequently charge that Socrates is
always "saying things the likes of which no human being
would believe?" (473e)
More importantly, however, the presumptive elenctic
knowledge account would require that elenchos makes use of
unexamined moral commonplaces as premises in the elenchos.
If Socrates uses as premises propositions which "the vast
majority of his fellows take as moral knowledge," then
Socrates' ground zero is ultimately moral commonplaces. But
this view does not square well with the Gorgias
.
For
example, when in his discussion with Polus, who defends what
he says is a moral commonplace that the unjust are happy,
Socrates says,
Cl Nearly every Athenian and foreigner will take your
side on the things you're saying, if it's
witnesses you want to produce against me to show
that what I say isn't true. . . Though I am only
one person, I don't agree with you; you don't
compel me. (472b6)
C2 I think it is better to have . . . the majority of men
disagree with me [me homolegein] and contradict me
[enantia legein] than to be out of harmony with myself
and contradict myself. (482cl-3)
C3 I disregard the things held in honor by the majority of
people. (526d5)
C1-C3 suggest that Vlastos is right in claiming that
Socrates appears to have an intellectual commitment to the
truth of certain propositions and a resolution to act upon
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them. However, if Socrates "proves" certain doctrines, as
Vlastos claims, the premises he uses in elenchos cannot be
commonplaces that he will employ in an argument without ever
checking first to see if they are true. So if Vlastos'
claim is true that Socrates ultimately relies on presumptive
elenctic knowledge, then Vlastos' defense of Socratic
elenchos in the Gorgias is mistaken. For this is a dialogue
in which Socrates is explicitly against using moral
commonplaces in the elenchos, whether it is held by the
majority or by the individual.
So, presumptive elenctic knowledge does not solve
Vlastos' dilemma of regression. Vlastos offers another
solution. He writes,
[Socrates] has a method that works well... It
organizes his moral intuitions into a set which is
reassuringly consistent, and moreover, proves
practically viable in his own experience . 54
The solution is the category of "moral intuition." I cannot
do justice here to the epistemological complexities
concerning the concept of intuition, or intuitionism . Since
Vlastos is not explicit as to how he is using this
notoriously difficult concept, I can only hypothesize. I
can see two plausible construals, either of which poses a
problem for his thesis.
Perhaps by "intuition" Vlastos means what is ordinarily
meant by it, namely, a hunch. Suppose Socrates simply has a
54 Vlastos [ 1 ]
,
p. 36
.
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hunch that g (or r, or B1-B10 above) is true. it is hard to
understand why anyone would launch an elenchos on a hunch.
Let us grant, however, that Socrates is a cantankerous man
who loves to argue and will jump in at any opportunity to
show his argumentative skills. Given that elenchos is his
life-long activity, 55 he would have to have many hunches to
work with. Just how many hunches on moral matters can one
have during a lifetime? It may be the case, however, that
Socrates really does not have an unlimited number of
hunches, but that he simply is a strange 56 man who will
always have more hunches than his interlocutors. 57 And let
us also grant that he has organized them into a consistent
set. But, somewhere early in his career, the beliefs from
which he now starts, must somehow have been chosen. 58
Before the first conclusion was arrived, if he simply went
on a hunch, and that hunch got the elenchos off the ground,
Socrates did not rely solely on elenchos for his moral
knowledge.
But perhaps by "intuition" Vlastos has in mind
something more philosophically significant and stronger than
a hunch. Perhaps he means it is knowledge that has not gone
55 See my Chapter 1 for Socratic occupation.
56 See my Chapter 1 for a discussion of the strangeness [atopos] of
Socrates
.
57 Vlastos responds similarly to Kraut [3] for his objection to
Vlastos conception of elenctic experience, see Vlastos [1], p.24, fn.63.
58 For the role of intuition in Plato's hypothetical method, see
Robinson (1), p.109.
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through elenchos, that is to say, some direct and immediate
knowledge that Socrates intuits, perhaps even by a special
faculty other than his senses. He might even have an
ability to -see'' by this special faculty that there are some
good states of affairs, and some evil ones. In fact, many
scholars, including Vlastos, acknowledge that Socrates takes
intuitive insight very seriously—whether it is expressed in
dreams, in the utterance of the Pythia or in the inner voice
of Socrates ' daimonion
,
or rites and passages of various
mystery cults. - But if Vlastos thinks Socrates has moral
intuitions which he relies on as premises in the elenchos,
then Socrates makes use of knowledge he has obtained non-
elenctically
. So for all the reasons I give above, Vlastos'
defense of his thesis that elenchos is Socrates' sole access
to moral knowledge is unsatisfactory.
Socrates' Religious Beliefs
There are good reasons, however, to take intuition, let
us say, knowledge nonelenctically obtained, especially of a
religious kind, seriously in the Gorgias . As I indicated
earlier, Socrates' positive and dogmatic tone in the Gorgias
is one of the fundamental pieces of the elenchos puzzle.
Why is Socrates certain in this dialogue that his beliefs
are true? Theories are plentiful as to the change in
w Some suggest that daimonion is that special faculty which reveals
Socrates divine truths; see Dodds "Plato and the Irrational Soul" in
Vlastos [10b], p.219 ff. Others argue that Socrates has a special
reason to trust elenctic results, because his daimonion never stops him
from conducting elenchos, see Brickhouse and Smith [3], p.148.
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Socrates ' tone. 61 Although all commentators note that
Socrates is more dogmatic in the Gorgias
,
none even explores
the possibility of Socratic dogmatism as a viable
explanation for his behavior. Vlastos himself describes,
and I believe rightly so, Socrates as a "street evangelist,"
a "missionary," and a "moralist." 61 But he rejects the
notion that Socrates is a dogmatist of any kind. 62 Vlastos
claims
,
First and foremost elenchus is search. . . Its object
is always that positive outreach for truth which is
expressed by words of searching . . . inquiring . . .
investigating. 63
In practice, this never happens in the Gorgias. In this
dialogue, Socrates' convictions press upon him with great
force and fervor. Consider the following statement by
Socrates
:
I know well that whenever you agree with me about
the things which my soul believes, this is the
very truth [aiethe]
.
(486e5)
This does not represent the sentiment of someone who is in a
mode of search for moral truth. There are many passages
where Socrates expresses the sentiments of a dogmatist, of
someone who asserts a matter of his opinion as if it were a
fact. When Socrates makes the statement— for which he gives
60 Dodds [2], p . 16 ; Irwin [4], p.6-7; Benson [1], p.64; Vlastos [1].
61 Vlastos [1], p.7; cf. Vlastos [7a].
62 Vlastos [1], p.19.
63 Vlastos ( 1 ] . p. 4 .
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no argument that the good is not the pleasurable, Callicles
responds, "That is your opinion, Socrates." (495b7) Another
striking example for the dogmatic character of Socratic
beliefs can be found in a crucial passage where Socrates
says that Polus and people like him attempt to but
ultimately fail to "dislodge me from my property, the truth
[ekbalein me t6s ousias kai tou alethous]." (472b6) in
another interesting and mysterious passage, Socrates claims,
"what is true is never refuted." (473b) My disagreement
with Vlastos turns on these passages and their implications
for the elenchos.
So far as I can see, Socratic evangelism for Vlastos
carries only moral and not any specific religious
connotation. The present distinction inevitably raises the
question of the relation between religion and morality, the
status and origin of moral principles, and the nature of
evangelism, which I cannot address here. I am only
concerned with Vlastos' account of elenchos in the Gorgias .
I maintain that he ignores altogether Socrates' religious
belief 64 in a real future existence and punishment after
death for the actions done before death. Socrates as a
street evangelist most certainly implores, coaxes, and
cajoles people so as to get them to change their minds to
care for their souls. He does so, because he thinks such a
64 By "religious" belief I mean a belief in a divine source that
issues in human conduct, e.g., morality. Admittedly this is a loose
meaning, and stricter ones are available.
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commitment will ultimately reward them in the afterlife.
This belief affords Socrates certain principles such as
those expressed in B1-B10 (or q and r above) which provide a
basis for his elenchoi as well as his moral conduct
unavailable to a nonbeliever, Callicles for example.
Addressing him, Socrates says,
The three of you, the wisest of Greeks today
—
you,
Polus and Gorgias
—
you are not able to prove
[ apodeixai ] that there's any other life one should
live than the one which will clearly turn out to
be advantageous [sumpheron] in that world. (527bl)
To confirm this reading, I want to present two
elenchoi, which I extract from the text following Vlastos'
own characterization of standard elenchos. 65 In these
elenchoi Socrates employs certain premises which, though
taken for granted by him, are not necessarily accepted by
the interlocutors. There is no textual evidence for
elenctic support for these premises. Nor is there any
reason to think that they have been established by repeated
elenctic success. I want to make the case that Socrates
accepts them as being true, because they express a certain
truth of religion. It is for that reason he claims that
what is true is never refuted. (473b, cf. 523a)
For instance, in one elenchos Socrates investigates
Polus' thesis
65 Again, these arguments are much simplified versions of what
actually takes place in the text. Although I am merely following
Vlastos' recommendations, the objection still holds that his account of
elenchos abridges very complicated arguments for which there are no easy
forms or names.
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p It is possible for an unjust man to be happy.
Socrates believes the opposite is true. He asserts but is
rebuked by Polus that
B6 The unjust man is thoroughly unhappy and more so
unless he is punished. (472e5)
Paying him no heed, Socrates continues with his argument
during the course of which he gets Polus to agree to a host
of other premises (such as B2 and B3 on the nature of
happiness
,
justice and punishment)
. They can be bundled up
in
B4 Punishment purifies the soul of evil. (479d)
Socrates then argues that B6 and B4 together with other
premises entail not-p. Therefore, he concludes, it is not
possible for an unjust man to be happy.
This particular argument has traditionally been
evaluated as part of a secular debate on the merits of
punishment. Recently, it has been argued that Euthyphro and
Charmides be viewed as special examples of Socratic attempts
to sort out the confusion about the concept of piety
resulting from the emergence of new religious beliefs in
Athens. 66 I suggest we re-view the Gorgias in a similar
manner and evaluate this argument in the context of Socratic
care for the soul's safe passage to the Isles of the
Blessed.
66 Morgan [2]
,
p. 21
.
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There is another elenchos which strengthens this
general reading. This is the purported elenchos against
Callicles
,
who believes
p The self-controlled man is not happy.
In an elenchos that he conducts by himself—Callicles
refuses to accept any of his premises—Socrates asserts and
agrees to
Bll Orderliness makes something good, and goodness makes
someone happy. (506e)
He then continues to assert, among others, premises such as
B7 and B9
,
which can be condensed into
B8 Self-controlled man is an orderly man. (506e)
Socrates then argues that Bll and B8 together with other
premises entail not-p. Therefore, he concludes, self-
controlled man is happy.
Where does Socrates find support for the premises he
uses in these arguments? Let us start by viewing Socrates
in the historical context of the religious turbulence of
Athens. Greek religion, as it developed in the sixth and
fifth centuries, was an amalgam of rituals, myths,
offerings, oracles, injunctions and beliefs. 67 Athens was
an arena in a wide array of festivals, holy days, and many
rituals, with which Socrates was frequently associated. One
of the most important religious developments of the latter
part of the fifth century was the introduction of a belief
67 Hadas, p.34 ff.
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in a general judgement of the soul after death. The idea
that virtue and vice in this life determine the character of
the afterlife, and that the pure soul receives the reward of
living forever in bliss seemed a barbarous tenet to most of
the Greeks, who viewed this belief as a hubristic attempt by
mortals to be like gods. 6* Key to this new belief 69 was the
idea that death was a release of the soul from the body
[sOma], which was seen as the tomb [s6ma] of the soul. Once
released from the body, the soul traveled to Hades where it
stood before judges who examined it and consigned it to an
existence which would be according to its deserts:
punishment for the wicked in Tartarus and happiness for the
good in the Isles of the Blessed. In order to receive the
rewards, a quiet and orderly life was required. The ascetic
ideal of happiness involved the perfect purification of the
soul. The ideal of purity in turn required that the
appetites and passions of the body be subdued and the soul
be nourished through contemplation and other mystical
activities. 70 Hence the new religious ideal prescribed a
68 Dover, p.263; Adkins, p.179 ff; Dodds in Vlastos [10b], p.219 ff.
Also Guthrie [3], and Morgan [2], p.19 ff.
69 For those who associate these beliefs with Orphism, see Guthrie
[4], Lloyd-Jones, and Bremmer.
70 See Harrison, p.454 ff; Morgan [1], chapters 1 and 2; Guthrie
[3], p. 153-171 , p.183-243; Adkins, p.141 ff.
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life of asceticism and disciplined rational activity of
self-examination
.
71
Socrates attempts to convince Callicles that the life
of pleasure brings only corruption to the soul, not
happiness. His specific moral recommendation for the health
of the soul is the attainment of order [kosmos],
specifically, self-control [ sophrosune]
. Socrates believes
that a pure soul is just. Justice makes people temperate,
which is a treatment against corruption. And punishment is
an important way to achieve justice for someone who has been
unjust, that is, not practiced self-control. (478a, 491e,
504a, 507c) Socrates makes these statements without any
apparent elenchos, and admits that "these things on the
whole seem a bit strange [atopa]" (493c4) 72 He then gives
a reason why we should believe these strange doctrines. He
says
,
Wise men [hoi sophoi] 73 claim that partnership and
friendship, orderliness, self-control, and justice
hold together heaven and earth, and gods and men,
and that is why they call this universe a world-
order [kosmon]
,
and not an undisciplined world-
disorder [akosmian]. ( 507e5-508a4
)
71 That is why Socrates thinks a philosopher is most certain to live
happily ever after. (526c)
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I think Vlastos' translation of this word as 'outrageous' is too
strong. Socrates simply means here that these doctrines are strange,
and literally, 'out of place.' Note that 'atopos' is also the nickname
that many of his interlocutors use to call Socrates, cf. my Chapter 1.
7? Regularly used by Plato indicate Pythagoreans whose religious
cult was considered peculiar, see Dodds [1], p.338.
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Socrates frequently says he believes the accounts given by
these wise men and other such people. (524b; 526d; 527a5-9)
.
He says to Callicles,
I suppose you'll think it's a tale [muthos] 74 but
I think it's an account [logos]; for I'll tell you
what I'm about to tell you in the belief that it's
true. (523a) 75
Why does Socrates place such confidence in the stories of
wise men? I think we can find part of the answer in Plato's
Seventh Letter. He writes,
We must always truly believe the ancient and holy
doctrines [logois] which reveal to us that the
soul is immortal and has judges and pays great
penalties when it is released from the body. On
account of the[se doctrines] we must also
consider suffering injustice to be a lesser evil
than doing it. (335a-b)
In his interpretation of elenchos, Vlastos is committed
to a chronology of the Platonic dialogues which preserves
the thought of the historic Socrates. 76 In his ten theses,
Vlastos argues that what distinguishes Socrates from Plato
is that Socrates has neither the interest in nor the
proficiency for issues involving the soul. 77 Vlastos claims
74 Kirk claims that Plato was the fist user of the term muthologia .
As it was used by the Greeks, muthos had a wide range of senses from a
'story' to an 'account'. See Kirk, p.8 ff.
75 For competing views of what Socrates might mean by logos and
muthos, See Morgan [2], p.73-74; Dodds [1], p.376-377; Irwin [6], p.242-
244.
16 See my Chapter 1, and see for differing chronologies Brandwood
[ 1 ]
;
Kahn [3], p.306; cf. Guthrie [1], p.236.
77 Thesis IIB, Vlastos [3], p.48. Vlastos is careful to qualify
what he says here: Socrates has no theory of a separable soul which
learns by recollection.
84
that the "strange" doctrines of the soul belong exclusively
to "Plato's middle period," 78 starting with the Meno
.
He
says it is "only by tenuous inference" that one can claim
that there are anticipations of a doctrine of the soul in
the Gorgias , 79
What Vlastos claims may be true for the theory of
recollection. However, the doctrine of the body and soul as
being distinct entities, the composition of the soul with
distinct parts, and the idea of the soul surviving death to
travel to a place where it will live forever in bliss if it
is pure are more than subtle hints in the Gorgias.*0 I agree
with the line of thinking that detects "non-Socratic
elements" in the Gorgias. If this line of thinking is
right, either we do not have Vlastos' Socrates in the
Gorgias, or this Socrates had certain beliefs that Vlastos
overlooks, because it would scuttle his interpretation of
the elenchos. Either way, Vlastos' account won't do.
Consider the following passages from the Gorgias.
Socrates says,
There is, I take it, something you call body and
something you call soul. (463e9-10)
78 Vlastos (1), p . 29 , f n. 73; cf. p.32, fn.51.
79 Vlastos [3], p.54, and fn.32.
80 Unlike Vlastos many scholars believe that there is good evidence
that by the time he wrote the Gorgias, Plato had developed the moral
psychology of the middle dialogues. They argue that the myths present in
this dialogue presuppose a doctrine of the soul of the middle dialogues.
See Klosko [1]. Irwin too acknowledges "non-Socratic" elements in the
Gorgias; see his [4] notes on 491d4, p.190-191; 493a, p.195; 3499e-500a,
p . 203-208 ; 507ab, p.221-222.
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He claims that if the soul didn't govern the body but the
body governed itself, "the world according to Anaxagoras 81
would prevail." (465d) Socrates argues that the body and
the soul are two distinct things, and so
Death [thanatos]
,
it seems to me, is in fact nothing
other than the separation [dialusis] of two things[duoin pragmatoin], the soul and the body from each
other [t6s psuches kai tou sOmatos ap ' alleioin 1
.
( 524b2
)
In a passage which some scholars take to be the precursor to
the Platonic tripartition of the soul, 82 Socrates says,
I heard one of the wise men say that . . . our body
[sOma] is our tomb [sema], and the part of the soul
[t6s psuches] in which we have desires [epithumiai] is
liable to be persuaded [ anapeithestai ]
.
(493a2-5)
Why does Socrates in the Gorgias insist on caring for
the soul? Socrates says a clever mythologist, perhaps a
Sicilian or Italian, 81 came up with an analogy for the
impure soul, which is that of a leaky jar. 84 He called
people foolish [anoetoi] if they were uninitiated [amuetoi]
into the faith. He said, "the part of the souls of fools
where their appetites are located is their undisciplined
part, one not tightly closed, a leaking jar." (493b) They
are fools because they do not believe in purifying their
His principle, "all things mixed together," describes a state where
no distinction is possible.
83 See Dodds in Vlastos (10b), p.300. Against Taylor and Burnet,
Dodds claims tripartition appears first in the Republic . Taylor and Burnet
claimed tripartition of the soul to be Pythagorean in origin.
83 Places traditionally associated with Orphics and Pythagoreans.
84 He is clever because he called the soul a jar [pithos] on account
of its being persuadable (pithanon).
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souls from passions and appetites, and leading a self-
controlled life. Further, they do not believe in punishment
in order to relieve their souls from the evils of excess.
Socrates says he does not want to be a fool, and hence he is
most concerned with maintaining a healthy soul [hygeistaten
ten psuchen]
,
because he believes that on Judgement Day
Every man who has passed his life justly [dikaios]
and piously [hosiOs]
,
when he dies, departs to the
Isles of the Blessed and live in complete
happiness [ eudaimonia ] , away from all evils, but
the man who had lived unjustly [adikbs] and
godlessly [atheOs] goes to the prison
[desmbtferion] of retribution [tiseos] and justice
[dikes]
.
( 52 3a6-b5 ) .
Socrates says he believes that these accounts have convinced
him that it is on the condition of one's soul that happiness
is determined. He says he believes that all that is in the
soul is evident after it has been stripped naked out of the
body. The judges can see that the soul that is full of evil
is due to "luxury, arrogance and incontinence in its
actions." This is also the soul that has not properly been
punished, and hence purified of evil. When the judge sees
such a soul he dismisses it straight to the punishment house
where it awaits intensely painful and frightening suffering.
(524d-525a) That is why he says he thinks about how he
will reveal "to the judge a soul that is as healthy as it
can be." So he says he tries
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to be and live as a very good man, and when I die,
to die like that. I call on [parakalo] 85 all
other people as well to this way of life ... I
take you to task, because you won't be able to
come to protect yourself when you appear at the
trial and judgement I was talking about just now
(526d5-e5)
.
Since some of the details 86 in the myths of the Gorgias
also appear in documents loosely described as "Orphic" it
has been argued that Plato drew his material from Orphic
sources. Although the source of all of these myths is
uncertain (some were undisputedly Pythagorean in orgin)
,
and
the point is subject to scholarly controversy, it is
uncontroversial that they express important religious
teachings. The tendency among scholars is to demythologize
the messages contained in these stories and argue that these
myths reflect general rules of conduct which Socrates
established by the preceding arguments. Accordingly, they
fail to find in these stories a specific belief in a really
threatening future punishment for wrongdoing. 87 To be sure,
the status of these myths is a matter of terrific scholarly
controversy. The controversy is between those who, in the
words of a commentator, "want philosophy to be
85 Socrates says he calls on others because he wishes to persuade them
[peisai] of these things in order to induce them to make a change
[ metathesthai ] . " (493c5 ff; cf. 493dl)
86 Especially certain topographical details such as leimbn as the
meadow of the blessed souls and the place of judgement; and triodous as
the infernal crossroads. See for more detail, Dodds (1], p.373-376.
87 Dodds ( 1 ]
,
p. 386
.
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'professional' with its uniform and distinct medium " 88 and
others who reject a crude dichotomy between myth and
argument. Vlastos seems to belong to the first group.
Although a substantial portion of the Gorgias is devoted to
Socrates' claims that he believes the accounts given by
these myths, Vlastos is dismissive of them. He declares the
stories to be "pure fable," and "embroidery," which come
"only after hard-won elenctic argument has established the
great truths ." 89
The Gorgias is a curious dialogue for many reasons.
One of the most curious things about it is that a dialogue
that is supposed to exhibit, in Vlastos' view, the triumph
of elenchos in proving certain positive convictions about
the just life concludes with no elenchos in sight. In light
of the passages discussed above, it is hard to understand
why Vlastos does not "believe" Socrates when he says he
believes in a real afterlife and so must care for his soul
now. If the answer is that this is Socratic irony, then we
need a set of standards to determine when Socrates is being
serious and when he is being ironic. But Vlastos provides
no such criteria.
Vlastos presents elenctic knowledge in the Gorgias as a
superior source of information about moral matters. If I am
88 Annas [ 2 ] , p. 119 .
89 Vlastos [3], p.116-7, fn.46. Likewise, Irwin [6] and Santas [1]
completely ignore these myths.
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right, however, it is Socrates' religious insights regarding
an orderly life that guides his elenctic activity. There is
no textual evidence that suggests that Socrates acquired
these specific insights as a consequence of repeated
elenctic arguments. Rather, they appear to be certain items
of a new dogma. If I am right, elenchos is not the only
means for Socrates to generate moral knowledge, at least in
the Gorgias. In some cases at least elenchos functions
merely as a means to sermonize. Evaluating elenchos in
light of this kind of knowledge leads us to see Socrates in
a different light, perhaps less congenial, but all the same,
it leads us more directly to the man in the text. I believe
this presents a more plausible reading of Socrates in the
Gorgias
,
some of whose moral teachings are rooted first in
faith, then passed on by elenchos.
CHAPTER 5
SOCRATES AND FALLACY
Does a Philosopher Cheat?
Does Socrates ever willingly cheat at elenchos?
Vlastos thinks, clearly not. He assumes that Socrates'
philosophical temperament will keep him from misusing his
method. Because Socrates does not cheat, Vlastos argues,
Socrates refutes his interlocutors fair and square. If he
refutes them, then he is successful in persuading them of
the importance of a more virtuous life than the one they are
defending
.
Vlastos seems to rely on the notion that acting
virtuously requires that Socrates conduct honest arguments.
But what if by honest arguments Socrates is unable to
persuade his interlocutor of the principles that he is
advocating, principles which are necessary for virtuous
life? Under such circumstances, does Socrates resort to
tricks in argument so that his interlocutor is compelled to
accept the Socratic principles? Does the end justify the
wily means?
Vlastos rejects this possibility offhand, and in my
view, too hastily. In Vlastos' treatment, not only is the
method perfect, so is the man who uses it: Socrates never
cheats in his elenchos. 1 It is on this simple assumption
1 Vlastos [3], especially "Introduction" and Chapter 5; cf. p.144-
146, p.155, p.236, p.279. See also his seminal piece on the elenchos
[7a], p.27 ff.
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that Vlastos treats Socrates' notoriously fallacious
arguments in the Gorgias
,
as being fixable
.
2 Imposing his
characteristically inspiring distinctions 3on the perennially
puzzling arguments of Socrates, Vlastos restores a flawless
elenchos as the proper and the only method of moral
philosophy. Socrates would never use this method to "bully"
interlocutors into views they are not persuaded that they
should hold, because this behavior would be inconsonant with
the Socrates' "character and activity" as a philosopher
.
4
Interestingly, most commentators, even if they are
critical of Vlastos' treatment of elenchos, fail to
challenge the assumption of Socrates' character, and in his
person, the character of the philosopher . 5 While some
ear li e *" scholars
6
had been willing to concede that Socrates
is not above the ploys of the sophists' of his day—he may
Santas [1], and Irwin (3), [4], [6] make the same assumption.
3 Vlastos argues that Socrates both does and does not mean what he
says, he both knows and does not know how one ought to live, he believes
and doubts the truth of certain moral propositions. See Vlastos [1], and
[3] for his relevant arguments for these distinctions.
4 See Vlastos [3], p.147.
5 See Irwin, [3], and Genzler.
6 Dodds [1); Friedlander; Guthrie [1].
7 See below for a discussion of who is a sophist. For the purposes
of this paper, a 'sophist' will be a general term including Gorgias,
Polus, and Callicles, though the latter was not known as being one.
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use deliberate fallacies*—Vlastos rejects this view. He
writes
,
None of the scholars who have seriously believed
that Socrates employed . . . consciously
fallacious inferences . . . has ever tried to
explain how such infidelity to the quest of truth
could be reconciled with . .
.
philosophizing.
9
Yet there is ample evidence for Socratic cheating,
especially in the Gorgias. So how does Vlastos explain the
apparent Socratic "infidelity to the quest of truth"?
Vlastos suggests the following distinction: In his "meta-
elenctic capers" Socrates cheats, but "when arguing
seriously" he does not cheat. 11 ’ Vlastos thinks that when he
is not conducting elenchos, Socrates has fun teasing his
interlocutors with verbal tricks, and mental puzzles. But
in his god-given work, elenchos, Socrates is "dead earnest."
Here he would not joke around, as this is the most serious
task of a search for the right way to live. (cf. G. 500b-c.)
So if there appears to be a fallacy in his arguments when he
is arguing seriously, it must be because there are ellipses
in it, not because he is cheating.
8 By a 'fallacy' I mean an argument in which the conclusion does
not follow from the premises; by 'deliberate fallacy' I mean a fallacy
which is not a result of simply a mistake in logic but of a deliberate
attempt to deceive or confuse. Whether or not a sophistical argument is
necessarily a deliberate fallacy, I am not in a position to evaluate in
this paper. See Klosko [2] for a distinction between fallacy and
sophistry. See Robinson [2] for Plato's use of fallacy.
9 Vlastos [3], p.155.
10 Vlastos [3], p. 138-139 . This distinction is supplemented by his
treatment of Socratic irony, which cannot be discussed here. The
distinction above is sufficient for my purposes.
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Vlastos suggests that there is "no reason to believe
that the tacit premises [are] suppressed with the intention
causing deceit." He maintains that a "sane stand on
this issue" would allow "stylistic reasons" for such
ellipses. In the quick pace that is characteristic of
elenchos, Socrates simply has no time to fill out certain
phrases. He clips his sentences to "reduce verbal
baggage ." 12 Vlastos writes,
To cheat his partners in this search would be to
sabotage the process by which he hopes to discover
moral truth himself; to cheat his interlocutors
would be to cheat himself. I want to argue that
such a thing could not happen within the limits of
Plato's characterization of Socrates . 13
In their review of Vlastos' Socrates : Ironist and Moral
Philosopher
,
Brickhouse and Smith correctly, albeit briefly,
point out the inadequacy of the distinction between "meta-
elenctic capers" and "arguing seriously ." 14 They suggest
that Vlastos needs a criterion for "arguing seriously," as
it is difficult to know exactly when that is taking place.
Agreeing with this general assessment, I propose to go
further. At the risk of taking an "insane" stand on this
issue, I will argue that Socrates cheats when arguing
" Vlastos [3], p.133, especially, fn.9. My emphasis.
12 Vlastos [3], p.141.
13 Vlastos [3]. p.135. My emphasis. See my Chapter 4 for the
philosophical problems arising from the notion of "discovery" of moral
truth in elenchos; cf. Vlastos [1], Chapter One.
14 Brickhouse and Smith [2].
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seriously, and for good reason. This reading has two
advantages over Vlastos': It is
reading of the text, and offers
interpretation of Socrates as a
supported by a more natural
a more defensible overall
philosopher
.
Let us now turn to one of the most controversial
arguments in the early dialogues: the elenchos against
Polus in the Gorgias. By re-evaluating this "standard
elenchos" 1
,
I hope to make clear the two cross-cutting
interpretations, Vlastos' and mine. I believe this will
provide compelling reasons for rejecting Vlastos' reading in
favor of my own. The elenchos at hand is the famous
"refutation" of Polus, Gorgias' young admirer, and his
expressed belief that a life of doing injustice is better
than the life of suffering injustice . 16 It is a notoriously
flawed argument, and has been the focal point of many
conflicting evaluations . 17 Though ultimately he thinks it
fixable, Vlastos himself was bothered by this argument;
indeed he dubbed it, "The Rotten Argument ." 18
See my Chapter Three for a discussion of what Vlastos' calls the
"standard" elenchos; cf. Vlastos [1], [7a], and [13].
16 Socrates has three distinct elenchoi against Polus: Sophists and
tyrants have no power in the city (466a-468e); Doing an unjust thing is
worse than suffering it (474c-475e); The unjust are miserable unless
they are punished (476a-480a). I will only consider the second
elenchos, as that is the controversial one.
17
It has been evaluated at least 10 times in print within the last
thirty years. See Vlastos [3], p.139-48; cf. Vlastos [11]; Dodds [1];
Friedlander; Guthrie [1]; Irwin [4], [6]; Kahn [3]; Klosko [2]; Santas
[1], and more recently, Genzler.
I!< Vlastos [3], p. 146 ; cf. Vlastos [11]. It is "rotten" because it
is hard to account for it in the "noble" pages of the Gorgias.
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Before we take a look at the argument, it is worthwhile
to note a piece of advice from Aristotle on Socratic
arguments. Aristotle warned,
The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; theyalways exhibit grace and originality and thought; butperfection in everything can hardly be expected(trans.
,
Barnes.) 19
The argument at hand is prefaced by a discussion
between Socrates and Polus over the nature of rhetoric (461b
ff.). Socrates suggests that the true nature of rhetoric is
flattery: rhetoricians are panderers. But Polus says that
rhetoricians do not need to pander to anyone since they have
power in the city. They are like tyrants: they do what they
think fit and get away with it. Socrates delivers an
extraordinary claim that those who do what they think fit
without intelligence are in reality powerless and miserable,
because someone who does injustice is miserable, more so if
he is unpunished, than a person who suffers even the worst
injustices. To Polus this is sheer nonsense. No one, Polus
says incredulously, including you, Socrates, would choose to
suffer injustice rather than to do it. Socrates' response
is shocking: Not only would he so choose, but so would
anyone else once he sees that doing injustice is worse than
suffering it. Here is how Socrates "proves" his point and
refutes Polus' view.
19 Barnes [2], Politics, ii, 6, 1265al0.
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The Rotten Argument ( 474c5-475el^ 20
P1 * Doi^ injustice [to adikein] is more kakos 21 thanln j ustlce [to adikesthai]. (No objection by
P2
. If it is more kakos, it is also more shameful[aischion] 22
.
P3
. Shameful and kakos are the same thing [tauton]
. So arebeautiful [kalon] 23 and good [agathon]. (Polus objectsthat they are not the same.)
P4
. Things are called 'beautiful' on account of their
pleasure [dia hedon^n tina] or benefit [dphelian] orboth, and 'shameful' by the opposite, pain [lupfe] andkakos or both. (Polus does not object.)
P5 * something is more beautiful than another thing, thenit surpasses the other in either pleasure or benefit.
If something is more shameful than another thing, then
it surpasses the other either in pain or kakos. (Taken
as self-evident.)
LI. If doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it,
then it surpasses suffering it either in pain or in
kakos. (Lemma from P2
,
P3
,
and P4
.
)
P6. Doing injustice does not surpass suffering it in pain.
(Polus does not quite understand why this is true, but
he concedes.)
L2 . Therefore, doing injustice surpasses suffering it in
kakos. (Lemma from P5 and P6.)
P7 . No one would choose something more kakos and more
shameful over that which that is less so.
C. Therefore, no one would choose doing injustice over
suffering it.
2,1 The argument is extracted from the text, and the premises are
stripped down for simplicity.
kakos is the term upon which the argument turns. The word has
been translated both as 'bad' and 'evil', neither of which captures the
fullness of the term in Greek. I will keep the term in its Greek to
avoid the additional connotations of 'evil' and the hollowness of 'bad'.
:: Also translated as 'ugly' or 'base'.
23 Also translated as 'admirable' and 'fine'.
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The argument leaves Polus dumbfounded. He reluctantly
concedes that no one would choose a life of doing injustice
over a life full of suffering injustice, "at least on this
argument," (475e2)
. Has Socrates proved his point? Vlastos
believes that once we clarify what Socrates means in P3
,
we
can confidently say that Socrates has refuted Polus fair and
square, and proved his point.
Let us briefly pause to get clear on what P3 amounts
to. Socrates is aware that Polus does not agree that
aischios and kakos
,
and kalos and agathos are "the same
thing" as he claims. Polus could have objected that there
are many shameful things that are not kakos or many things
beautiful but not good. (Socrates himself makes that very
point in the when he says in the Hippias Minor that a liar
is shameful and beautiful for he has the power of intellect
to lie, 368a.) But Polus is quiet (Callicles says Polus was
ashamed to contradict Socrates) . Socrates delivers P4 as a
general conclusion arrived by an epagogue 24 so as to get
Polus to agree to P2 and P3 . He secures Polus' agreement
that bodies are called 'beautiful' [kalos] because they are
An epagogue is an argument in which one's mind is "led on" to a
general characteristic from the observation of particular examples.
Whether an epagogue is true induction or not is, of course,
controversial. For the view that it is, see Guthrie [1], vol. Ill,
p.426-437; Gulley, p.13-22. For the opposite view, see Robinson [1],
p.35-38; Vlastos [13], p. xxix, f n . 18 , 45; [7a], p.30; [2], p.267-269.
Arguing that epagogic arguments are reinforcements to a general
statement, Vlastos says that epagogue is intuitive induction, whereby a
conclusion of the universal is intuited before the particular cases. In
this case, the purpose of the examples is to help us understand the
conclusion rather than demonstrate it.
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either useful or pleasant, or both. The same is true of
shapes, colors, sounds, laws, and learning. Hence, the
general conclusion is that all things are called beautiful
because they are either useful or pleasant, or both. That
is why we think, Socrates argues, beautiful and good, and
shameful and kakos are the same thing.
So, it appears that by P4 Socrates assumes that the
pleasurableness of an object is a sufficient condition for
its beauty. But how can that be? Surely there are objects
that are pleasurable but not beautiful. 25 What is Socrates
up to? Vlastos has an answer. He says, Look, Socrates
could not possibly mean what he says in P4 . Why? Take a
look at what he says in the Hippias Major. There Socrates
declares that a most pleasurable experience may be ugliest
to view. In an ongoing discussion about the nature of the
beautiful [to kalos] Socrates says,
'As to the act of sexual love [ta aphrodisia], we
should all, no doubt, contend that it is most
pleasant [hediston]
,
but that one must, if he
perform it, do it so that no one else shall see,
because it is most repulsive to see. [aischiston
horasthai]'. (trans.
,
H.N. Fowler.) 26
Relying exclusively on this quotation, Vlastos says,
"It is made completely clear that [Socrates] does not
consider the pleasurableness of an object of experience a
Socrates himself is a case in point. Though notoriously ugly,
Socrates is an object of pleasure for many, i.e., for Alcibiades.
26 HMa . 299a7-8. See below for the explanation of the presence of
the quotation marks.
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sufficient condition of its beauty." 27 So, although in P4
Socrates says that objects are beautiful on account of their
pleasurableness, Vlastos thinks that Socrates means
something different. In other words, we can "fix" P4 once we
get clear on what Socrates could possibly mean by it. 2s
Hippias Major is rather an unfortunate choice for
fixing P4
. There are three major reasons this interpretive
ploy is unacceptable. First, and most obviously, if Vlastos
is right, every time there is an unsecured premise in a
particular argument we have to resort to other dialogues.
If one rejects the view that dialogues cannot profitably be
read without reference to one another, this quotation
becomes unhelpful in making sense of P4
.
Vlastos' choice of Hippias Major is puzzling in a less
obvious way as well. This is one of the great "aporetic"
dialogues, in which Socrates rejects every definition of the
beautiful as unsatisfactory, and the result of the dialogue
is a deadlock [aporia]
. Then there is the case of "a
certain man" who threw Socrates himself into deadlock [tis
eis aporian me katebalen], (286c5-6). The dialogue proceeds
on Socrates' contention that this man is sure to find fault
with every definition proposed on the beautiful. The
21 Vlastos [3], p.141.
28 There have been many other attempts to "fix" Socratic arguments,
(cf. "Suppose we correct Socrates' mistake," Santas [1], p.238, p.138.)
In a surprising statement, Vlastos says that no scholar before Santas
and Irwin noticed the exact point a fallacy might appear to be taking
place in this argument, Vlastos [3] p.139. See however, Robinson [2],
first published in 1942.
100
particular text Vlastos quotes pertains to the perplexity,
generated by this man, at the claim that the beautiful is
that which is pleasing through the senses. 29 The category
of "a certain man" and its significance in this and other
dialogues has been the subject of scholarly debate.
Vlastos, however, neither addresses the controversy nor
addresses the role of aporia in this dialogue.
This brings me to the third objection to relying on the
Hippias Major for help in reading the Rotten Argument, and
this is that Plato puts forward the same analysis of the
beautiful in the Republic as the one given in P4
. At this
point, Vlastos might object and say that the Socrates in the
Republic Book V is not the same Socrates in the Hippias
Major . 311 But this would be a weak objection indeed, as we
do not know what criterion he uses to pick and choose the
definitive answers held by the Socrates in the Hippias
Major. The issue in the Republic is the shamefulness
[aischrios] of older female guardians exercising in the
nude. For Plato the important issue is having qualified
guardians for the good of the city, not the "ugly" sight of
sagging flesh. So those who ridicule the idea of unclad
women forget what is in their benefit in the long run. He
says
,
"9
"If this man of whom I speak [ouro; ov XeY u / outos on legO] should
ask us", HMa
.
298d7.
30 Vlastos' Socrates, as he defends in his ten theses [3], p.46 ff.
See my Chapter One for the chronology of the dialogues Vlastos accepts.
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For the fairest [kallista] thing that is said
ever will be said is this, that what is usefulbeautiful, and what is hurtful ugly [to menbphelimon kalon, to de blaberon aischron.l (R457b) 31
or
is
So the Hippias Major quotation does not in fact help
make Vlastos' case here. Let us, however, grant Vlastos his
quotation. For the important point is this. Vlastos thinks
Socrates means by P4 that what makes an object beautiful
evidently is the pleasure the viewer derives from viewing
(hearing, feeling, etc.) the object. On Vlastos' view, when
we make the necessary substitutions to provide what Socrates
must have 32 left out, we get the following. 33
When Socrates says:
(1)
Doing injustice is not more painful than suffering it.
He means:
(1)
* Doing injustice is not more painful for the wrongdoer
than is suffering injustice for the victim.
When Socrates says:
(2) Doing injustice is either more painful or worse than
suffering it.
He means:
(2)
* Doing injustice is either more painful or worse for the
wrongdoer than suffering it is for the victim.
When Socrates says:
(3) Doing injustice is worse than suffering it.
He means:
31 This is one of the texts cited for the alleged utilitarianism in
Plato's moral "theory." (ophelimon suggests both 'benefit' and
'utility'.) This is a controversy which I cannot address here, but see
Irwin [6], who supports the view, and Vlastos' rejection [9b].
3: See Vlastos [3], p.141: "There can be no reasonable doubt. . . A
close reading of the text should convince anyone that this is indeed
what is meant."
33 Vlastos [3], p.143-44.
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(3)* Doing injustice is worse for the wrongdoer than issuffering it for the victim.
But why, we ask, does Socrates say what he does, if
this is what he means? Particularly vexing in Vlastos'
account of the Socratic method are his assumptions that
Socrates argues with "elliptical expressions for what he
means," and that when the argument seems like a fallacy,
then Socrates speaks in an abbreviated way. Socrates prunes
verbal baggage, as he always does. Vlastos claims this is
quite usual for Socrates. He writes,
For Socrates to say (3) when (3*) is exactly what
he means—using the former as though it were
merely an abbreviated way of saying the latter— is
not exceptional
.
34
So given what Vlastos calls the "thoroughly unsound"
Rotten Argument, it appears that either Socrates is cheating
to trick Polus—the problem in P4 seems to escape Polus—or
Plato is unaware of the slip. Since Socrates does not
cheat, Vlastos argues, Plato must be ignorant of the
ellipses. 1'’ Before we get to the part about why Vlastos
thinks Socrates would not cheat, let us pause a minute on
Vlastos' claim to know what Socrates means. There is a
helpful distinction, drawn by Jerry Fodor, between what a
Vlastos [3], p.145. Vlastos "shows" other abbreviations in the
text: "What he thinks" at 467a-b is a contraction to "what he thinks is
best" in 468d, and "believing that is better" at 468b is a contraction
for "believing that it is better for ourselves."
35 Vlastos [3], p.144 ff., and see on p.148. "Surely it is simpler
to suppose that he is himself unaware of the fallacy."
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sentence x means and what someone, say Socrates, means by
sentence x.'6 Fodor argues that what sentence x means may
be explained by the appropriate conventions of language,
while what Socrates means by sentence x is an unanswerable
question. Fodor argues that this is due to the fact that
every speech act is a result of an internal, mental act of
meaning or intending. So we have the following
distinctions: (a) what sentence x means and (b) what
Socrates means by sentence x. If Fodor is right, it is
always possible that (a) and (b) are different. Again, on
Fodor s distinction, Vlastos claims to have an explanation
for (b) while all he can give is an explanation for (a) .
The best we can say with respect to P4 is that the scope of
'pleasure', 'benefit', etc. is unclear in the way Socrates
is using them. The purpose of the unclarity is, of course,
the controversial point here.
There are two other problems with the Rotten Argument,
which Vlastos overlooks. First, Vlastos does not address
why Socrates claims that P6 is true, that is, why doing
injustice does not surpass suffering injustice in pain.
(475c ff.). Socrates and Vlastos both assume P6 without
argument. The operative word here is 'pain' [lupfe], which
is clearly equivocal; it could mean physical pain or
36 Fodor, p.499-509.
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'psychological distress' or both. 37 Neither Socrates, nor
Polus, nor Vlastos makes a distinction between these senses.
But which sense is meant matters for the outcome of the
elenchos. For if lupe is meant in the physical sense, then
P6 maV be true; those doing injustice may either directly or
indirectly cause physical pain to others, while they
themselves experience no such pain. A tyrant may jail,
torture or otherwise abuse another, for instance. So doing
injustice may not surpass suffering it with in terms of pain
caused. But if lupe is meant in a psychological sense, then
surely P6 is false. A person doing injustice may suffer
great psychological distress even while doing the bad deed.
In fact, this sense of the word is consistent with the
general Socratic conception of justice for the individual as
the psychic order of soul, and injustice as the corrupt
order. (G. 491d-e, 506d-e, 508a; cf. R. 345a-c, 347e, 351c-
d.) So, doing injustice may indeed surpass suffering it in
pain if it is meant by 'pain' psychological distress.
Another important point that is overlooked by Vlastos
is what this particular elenchos is about, namely, a choice:
Socrates asks Polus which life he would choose, a life of
doing or one of suffering injustice. The conclusion of the
argument states that no one would choose doing injustice
over suffering it, and Polus consents to the conclusion.
17 Irwin's translation suggests that lup£ refers to psychological
distress; see Irwin [4], p.46, also, p.156 fn. Zeyl translates it as
'pain' and keeps it neutral, p. 40-42.
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However, is he going to be compelled to choose a life of
suffering injustice as a result of this argument? Vlastos
thinks he will have to since he is defeated. But Polus
clearly will not opt for a life of suffering injustice.
That is why he says he will not act in such a way so as to
choose such a life, but it seems [phainetai] that suffering
injustice is preferable, "at least on this argument [kata
touton ton logon]." In fact, Polus agrees to the
conclusions of other elenchoi against him always with the
same tentativeness of "so it seems [phainetai]" (i.e. 479dl,
d5)
.
What is particularly telling, which Vlastos fails to
mention, is that to the famous proclamation38 by Socrates
that he has proved [ apodedeiktai ] what was asserted as true
[alethfe], Polus again responds with the same ambivalence,
"so it seems [phainetai]," (479e9). In other words,
elenchos has no persuasive power to compel Polus to make the
necessary internal change to live by the principles of a
virtuous life, it only silences him for the moment. 34
A more promising approach in evaluating this argument
comes from evaluating its purpose. In his discussion of
this particular argument in the Gorgias
,
Charles Kahn
w See my Chapter Three, and Vlastos [7a]. He builds his
interpretation of the positive result of elenchos upon this quotation.
39 That is also why Socrates is reduced to conducting an elenchos by
himself at the end of the dialogue (506c-510a), as no one is persuaded
by his arguments, and no one is unwilling to answer any of his
questions. Oddly, this fact gets no serious attention at all in the
current scholarship. Vlastos does not mention it, not even in a
footnote
.
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persuasively argues that it is ad hominem. it is directed
against Polus himself, not his statements, because Socrates
wants to shame him into seeing that he "cannot give an
account of good and bad, right and wrong, that is consistent
with [his] own life and [his] own convictions." 40 Though I
do not agree with Kahn's assessment of the reason for the ad
hominem that Socrates wanted Polus see in Socrates the very
paradigm of the just--I think that Socrates' "refutation" of
Polus is an example of cheating in argument. In fact,
Callicles
,
who is on to the fact that Socrates is cheating,
puts it well when he says to Socrates,
If a person is ashamed [aischuntai] and doesn't
dare to say what he thinks, he is forced
[anakazetai] to contradict himself [enantia
legein]
. This is the clever [to sophon] trick
you've thought of, with which you work mischief
[kakourgeis] in your arguments [logois]. (483al)
Is Socrates a Sophist?
Why does Vlastos insist that there is "no reason to
believe" that Socrates would have intentions to deceive? I
think the answer, though Vlastos does not say it explicitly,
is that Socrates has good moral character. I think that the
reluctance to attribute to Socrates the behavior purportedly
characteristic of a lesser person is due to the mistaken
assumptions that there are two methods of a different moral
order, philosophical, and sophistical, and that anyone who
40 Kahn [ 2 ] , p. 119
.
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practices the first method would never stoop to practice the
second
.
It is commonplace to describe Socratic elenchos as a
philosophical argument. The format involves questions and
short answers between two parties to get at the truth. By
contrast, the sophistical method is supposed to be one which
involves long rhetoric and verbal tactics to score points
against an opponent. It is also commonplace to point out
the inadequacies of using length or question-and-answer
format as a criterion to distinguish philosophy from
sophistry, because there are many instances in which
Socrates delivers long speeches (cf. G. 519e; 490d; but
4 65e)
,
and many others in which a sophist performs in a
question-and-short-answer format (cf
.
G. 449b; 461e-462a)
.
So, what, if anything, can we say about the character
of the method of Socrates, and the man himself? How is
Socrates supposed to be different from a sophist? The
answer to this question is treated as self-evident in the
current literature: philosophy is distinct from sophistry by
virtue of its method. However, distinctions familiar to us
between sophistry and philosophy from Plato's and
Aristotle's writings were by no means commonly known, let
alone accepted, by most people during most of the fifth and
fourth centuries in Athens. The term 'sophist' in its
negative connotations was largely due to its later usage
determined by the influence of Plato and Aristotle. In
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their depiction, 'sophist' came to denote, in opposition to
'philosopher', someone who seemed to have philosophical
ability, but in fact did not have, and who gained his
effects from fallacious arguments not directed at truth.
But in fifth century, the word was still general in scope
and neutral in tone. "it could be used to denote anyone
pressing exceptional knowledge, skill or talent of any kind,
and was not necessarily deragotary or ironical." 41
In a system such as Athenian democracy, which some
scholars dub as "government by public meeting," 42 the
ability to speak and persuade others was clearly of utmost
importance. The use of persuasion was a central feature of
Athenian public life in the 5th and 4th centuries, B.C. The
meaning of the term 'sophist' was in principle quite wide,
ranging from a poet and a diviner [sophistai] used by Hesiod
and Pindar, to a teacher of wisdom. In this wide sense, the
term was often applied to Socrates. 43 More narrowly, a
sophist was someone who taught persuasion, usually for a
fee, namely, how to speak in public and to defend ideas
before the assembly or in a court of law. 44 In other words,
a sophist was concerned with the art of words, either by
teaching this art to others, or, sometimes, showing it in
41 Hussey, p.114 and ff.
42 Buxton.
43 Kerferd, p.55-57.
44 de Romilly [1], p.l ff.
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public displays. 4 "' Yet, just how to separate46 Socrates
from the sophists was a matter of serious concern for
Plato. Indeed, Plato's own attitude toward persuasion is
one of mystery. In the Gorgias
,
and elsewhere48 Plato
displays contempt for the art of professional persuasion.
But the Gorgias as a whole depicts Socrates in an untiring
attempt to persuade his interlocutors.
Vlastos wants to separate Socrates from the sophists of
his day on the basis of his method. But it is not clear
whether sophists of the Socratic period had a method, by
which they could be identified, in the way Vlastos thinks
Socrates can be identified as a philosopher on the basis of
elenchos. This is a serious problem. If Vlastos is right
about there being two characters in the Platonic dialogues,
both with the name 'Socrates'—and that the earlier
dialogues represent the views of the historical man named
' Socrates ' --then he must give us a convincing reason for why
we should believe that Socrates is so confident in his
philosophic method as that which separates him from other
methods. And this Vlastos must do when history tells us
45 Such displays are a constant feature of the writing of both
Euripides and Thucydides. They were not "invented" by the sophists.
They are already to be found in Sophocles and are a central feature of
even the earliest comedies. See de Romilly [1].
46 The most famous example is of course Aeschines who classified
both Demosthenes and Socrates as sophists, In Timarch.113, 175, cf. 125.
47 For views on the problem of separating Socrates from the
sophists, see Nehamas [2] and Kerferd.
48 For instance, Phaedrus
,
or late books of the Republic
.
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that the boundary between philosophy and sophistry had not
clearly been drawn. After all, isn't it due to the very
confusion over this boundary that Socrates gave up his life?
Isocrates is a case in point for the confusion on this
very issue still reigning in Athens even after the death of
Socrates
.
44 A contemporary of Plato, Isocrates struggles
with Plato for the correct understanding of philosophy. 50
Against Plato, he argues that it is impossible to attain
knowledge [epistfemfe] of anything, let alone knowledge of how
we should live. Because knowledge is impossible, the next
best thing, he argues, is to have true opinions [doxa] 51
about practical matters, (Ant. 271, cf.184). Philosophy
turns out to be education in such matters for Isocrates,
namely, the art of discourse [tous logous], both in speaking
well [to legein eh] and thinking right [to phronein]
,
(Ant.
278)
.
This education enables one to govern wisely oneself
as well as the state, as no one who learns to speak well and
49 •Isocrates, Antidosis
,
Against the Sophists
,
Helen, On the Peace,
abbreviated Ant., Ag . Soph, Helen, Peace.
50 Interestingly, Isocrates is not usually discussed as a
philosopher, even though he says he is one. Recently, Edward Schiappa
has argued that Isocrates is "marginalized" in the current philosophical
literature, because his work does not match our current conception of
what is really philosophy. Because his work does not fit in that
conception, Isocrates becomes by definition a non-philosopher. See his
"Isocrates and Canons," presented to the Society for Ancient Greek
Philosophy, December 30, 1993.
51 Doxa and epist&m& comprise the root of the epistemological and
metaphysical difference between Isocrates and Plato, respectively. It
can be argued that Plato's use of 'dialectic' was an effort to find a
method to separate epistGme from doxa. This is not the place to pursue
the nature of this effort, it is sufficient to point out, however, that
the dispute was by no means settled.
Ill
think properly would support unjust [adikas] or petty
affairs, (Ant. 285). Instead, he would habituate
[sunethizomenos] himself in choosing the right action
because of his right thinking, thereby he becomes devoted to
the common good, (Ant. 276) . In fact, a true philosopher is
a wise man [sophos] who wants to persuade others [peithein
boulomenos] in the affairs of righteousness, (Ant. 278; 282;
275; cf. Peace, 34) . Those who teach the kind of speaking
that is not conducive to right thinking and right action,
mock and mimic the philosopher, (Ant. 284). They claim they
can teach righteousness for a small fee; they perform public
displays [ epideixeis ] , contest each other [diagonizomenous]
,
and argue in a disputatious fashion [erizontas], (Ant. 147;
cf. Ag . Soph. 7, 19). These people claim to be teachers of
wisdom [sophian didaskontas]
,
but do not deserve their name.
It is not clear how much Isocrates and Plato influenced
each other. For instance, all the words in brackets above
also appear in Platonic texts, the implications of which I
cannot fully explore here. Isocrates separates true
sophists 52 (philosophers) from the "imitation" sophists.
His derision of the imitation sophists resonates in Plato's
own criticism of them (cf. G. 519c, 460e; R. 539 ). 53 They
5
~ Isocrates considers Protagoras, Gorgias, the universally accepted
sophists, in the same category as Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, and
Empedocles, (Helen 1-3; cf. Plato's Phdr. 261d).
53 Plato ridicules only the lesser characters who claim to be wise,
not the "real” sophists such as Gorgias or Protagoras. He also
separates Isocrates from other sophists when he says that Isocrates has
by nature a bit of philosophy [tis philosophia] in his mind (Phdr.,
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both emphasize 'eristic' and 'antilogic' as being
significant tools of the sophists.
Although it is controversial whether or not these terms
denote particular forms of arguments, I will take them to be
merely describing the techniques with which an argument can
be used and manipulated
.
54 For my purposes, it is
suffic i-ent to have a general sense of the purported contrast
between eristic and antilogic, on the one hand, and
elenchos, on the other. Named after Eris, the goddess of
discord and strife, eristic is contentiousness in argument.
The aim of an eristic argument is to score points and win
the argument. It is not clear whether this requires a
fallacy. However, eristic has pejorative connotations both
for Plato and Isocrates. They both regard the techniques of
eristic beneath what they each take to be the philosophic
practice, as it is more concerned with victory than the
quest for truth. It will be remembered that this is exactly
the same attitude Vlastos takes Socrates to be holding.
'Antilogic,' on the other hand, refers to argument used
for the purpose of generating contradiction. Again, it is a
matter of considerable scholarly controversy just what this
entails. In a famous passage of the Republic
,
Socrates
complains that when the young get a taste for reasoned
279a)
.
54 Kerferd argues that they are particular forms of argument, while
in a convincing rebuttal, Nehamas [2] claims they merely refer to the
ways in which an argument are used.
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argument [logos], they play with it. Imitating those who
cross-examine them [ exelenchontas
] , they use arguments for
the purpose of establishing contradictions [eis antilogian]
,
( 599b3-6 ) . Older men, on the other hand, would clearly not
take part in such craziness [mania]; they choose to imitate
those who converse together [ dialegesthai ] to discover the
truth rather than those who play around simply to generate
contradictions [ antilegonta ]
.
(G. 539c5-8; cf. 500b-c.)
Appealing to this passage, some commentators, like
Vlastos, suggest that antilogic is elenchos gone bad, and
that the contrast between antilogic and elenchos is one of
purpose, not method. On that view, Socratic elenchos is
conducted for the purpose of finding the true path to the
virtuous life, and antilogic for the exclusive and unsavory
purpose of victory. 55 And since he is the "model" of the
virtuous philosopher whose purpose is to persuade people of
the righteous life, Socrates could not possibly conduct
eristic arguments, nor would he employ antilogic. He would
be the old man who chooses to have a conversation to
discover the truth rather than play around with arguments to
win or contradict the views of his interlocutors.
Unfortunately, this is too easy a conclusion. First,
if true, the abovementioned view conflates Plato's depiction
55 Vlastos [3], [7a]; Genzler, Nehamas [2].
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of dialectic with Socrates' elenchos
.
56 if we grant Vlastos
the view that the early dialogues are representative of the
views and method of Socrates, then we have no good reason
for that conclusion. Even if we grant difference in motive,
there is nothing in appearance that would preclude Socrates
from using the very arguments sophists would use . 57 since
we cannot distinguish the methods without interpretative
schemes for motive, we have no grounds to claim that the
behavior is different. Second, the argument against Polus
is an instance of both eristic and antilogic, and as such,
cheating. It is only by employing such means that Socrates
could score a point against Polus, for scoring points is the
only accomplishment in an argument Polus understands. Here
I am operating with an assumption that the character and the
depth of elenchos is intimately connected to the character
and the philosophic acumen of his respondents. 5 * Whom
Socrates talks with determines the length and complexity of
the elenchos against him: his elenchos against the young
Against many contemporary commentators, I am not assuming that
elenchos, practiced by Socrates, is the same procedure that Plato names
as 'dialectic' in the later dialogues. (For my argument, see my
Appendix
.
)
57 Plato is aware of the fact that a sophist may well appear
identical to the philosopher, but he argues that the appearance is not
real, (cf. Sop. 268cl; R. 454a-c, Tht . 164c-d). See Nehamas [2] for the
view that Plato had to come up with the theory of Forms and dialectic in
order to justify the apparent difference.
58 See Coventry and Teloh for an in-depth discussion of this point.
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"colt" 59 Polus eristically, for that is what he will
understand best. Polus is young, and contentious as well as
self-righteous about his moral ideals. It is obvious that
he would not hesitate to cheat Socrates in argument if he
possibly could. According to Vlastos, however, none of this
would be sufficient for Socrates to conduct eristic
arguments with Polus. Resorting, again, to another dialogue
to fix the problem here, Vlastos writes,
[Socrates] does not believe in returning harm for
harm [Cr. 49c-d]--and to deceive Polus in this
argument would certainly be to harm him by
aggravating the moral befuddlement
,
duping him
into thinking that those delusive inferences
secure foundation for a tremendous moral truth. 60
But if Polus can be duped this easily, why does
Socrates present this befuddling argument to him? Why not
give the simpleminded something really simple? Why bother
with this puzzling refutation of ambiguities, equivocations,
and tacit premises? Since Vlastos does not agree with my
assumption that Socrates uses different kinds of elenchos
with different kinds of people for different purposes,
Vlastos cannot answer this question. Or he might say that
there is nothing particularly befuddling about this
argument, and that Socrates always argues like this. But
this still fails to explain why he goes to such lengths. I
59
"The young colt here is young and hasty [pOlos hode neos esti kai
oxus]" (G. 463e2). 'Colt' is a pun on Polus' name, suggesting that Polus
is untamed, and wild, hence unphilosophical
.
60 Vlastos [ 3 ]
,
p. 148
.
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believe a more compelling answer lies in the character of
Polus. Polus would be the first to use the very tricks
Socrates uses, for he is the kind of man whose purpose in
life is to get ahead, and score big against others.
Socrates scores against him by silencing him. He wins the
round. Though this silence is not going to generate an
internal change in Polus toward a virtuous life, it will at
least force him to come up with better arguments to support
his views next time.
Now I go back to something Vlastos says, namely, that
no one who believes that Socrates cheats can reconcile this
"infidelity to the quest for truth" with philosophizing. In
light of the discussion above, I suggest that this very
conception is informed by Vlastos' unexamined assumptions
about what a philosopher does, and is further in conflict
with his conception of the cooperative activity of Socratic
elenchos. If Vlastos is right, then the quest for truth is
essentially a lonely endeavor. It does not involve others,
because the philosopher does not need to entertain others'
views, nor does he have to win anyone over. He makes no
concessions. One either takes it or leaves it. But at the
same time, Vlastos thinks of the Socratic method as being a
powerful tool of persuasion. But this surely involves
cajoling others to drop certain beliefs, take up other and
better, and even true ones. So if this strand of Vlastos'
thinking is right, then the quest for truth is essentially a
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sociable activity. Hence, Vlastos not only fails to answer
why victory in the quest of truth is incompatible with
philosophizing, but also allows the conflict in his thinking
to misdirect his interpretation of Socrates.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Vlastos ' work on the method of Socrates has raised many
compelling questions; among them I have concentrated on
those concerning the foundation of moral knowledge and the
use of method. Vlastos' treatment of the Socratic method is
unique both in its originality and in its command over the
texts. Vlastos' command over the philosophical and
philological concerns in those texts is also awe-inspiring.
It nevertheless raises important issues related to doing
history of philosophy. The most pressing issue is over-
interpretation. Here we have a straightjacket reading of
the texts, the Gorgias in particular, in which certain
sections are omitted and certain themes underexamined as
they might jeopardize a particular interpretation. As I
have shown, Vlastos' skillful design in approaching the
Socratic dialogues relies on many distinctions, which in his
judgement are waiting to be made in the dialogues. Once
they are made, Vlastos hopes to show that notorious
ambiguities and difficulties in the text fade, bringing
forth a clear picture of the Socratic method. Although
Vlastos' layout is magnificent, the question is, of course,
whether the picture is really this clear.
On Vlastos' reading, the Gorgias is a dialogue which
shows what elenchos can establish. The father of philosophy
and the philosophical method, it seems, relies only on his
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own rational method in order to hold beliefs that he
justifies by this method. In the way Vlastos presents his
Socrates, one might think that this Socrates would never
fall into moral perplexity 1 himself as to how to persuade
people into right conduct for righteous life. He is not the
man who tries all the tricks in the book, uses an ambiguous
word here, makes a false substitution there, at times, just
to win his argument. He is not the man who exhorts, urges
and sometimes outright pesters his interlocutors. It is as
if we have a schizophrenic 2 at hand.
However, as I discuss in my Chapter Four, it is unclear
exactly what this method consists in. There are no
sufficient examples of it, nor is there a particular
depiction of the elenctic argument. This leaves us stranded
and grasping at metaphors. Furthermore, Vlastos'
interpretation of the rational and confident Socrates forces
an exceedingly one-sided portrayal of this enigmatic man.
Just as there was in the 19th century a pronounced
resistance among the leading Platonic scholars even to
address Platonic homosexuality as a significant
consideration in understanding his ethics, so there is now a
similar resistance in Socratic scholarship, led by Vlastos,
1
I thank Gary Matthews for sharing his paper on Socratic perplexity,
with most of which I am in complete agreement. See Matthews [1].
- Vlastos argued that Socrates of the earlier Platonic dialogues and
Socrates of the later ones were so different in content and method that
"they could not have been depicted as cohabiting the same brain throughout
unless it had been the brain of a schizophrenic," Vlastos [3], p.46.
My point here is that the real schizophrenic might be Vlastos' Socrates.
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to take seriously Socrates' belief in the extra-rational as
providing a significant epistemological ground for his
elenchos. What is at stake here is how much reasoning is
needed to arrive at basic moral judgements. On this issue
there is often a split between those who hold that [A] all
moral knowledge is obtained by moral reasoning, and others
who hold that [B] moral knowledge is acguired some other
way, for example, by direct apprehension or revelation.
While it is clear that Vlastos wants to present and defend
Socratic elenchos in a way consistent only with [A], his own
account leaves open the possibility of an interpretation
consistent with [B]
.
As has been suggested by others, I take the Gorgias as
the paradigm not of the power of elenchos, but of its
limitations. This of course revives, in a much needed way,
an older debate which has gotten lost in the recent one on
the limits of Socratic epistemology. If I am right, in a
more natural reading of the Gorgias
,
method is not all.
Socrates needs elenchos not for acquiring his moral
doctrines, but only for dispensing them. Of course, to
show that elenchos is not essential for moral knowledge does
not undermine the fact that Socrates has and imparts
positive moral knowledge. It simply suggests a more
compelling explanation, namely, that the Socratic method is
one of the tools at the service of Socratic moral doctrines.
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Socrates persuades his interlocutors of the truth of his
convictions in a number of different ways.
Another issue in Vlastos' interpretive scheme is his
classical assumption that a virtuous man will automatically
do virtuous acts. The problem here is that this assumption
is informed by post-Socratic assessments about virtue and
virtuous acts, such as those expressed by Aristotle. I
think that this assumption, lurking in the back of Vlastos'
assessment of the powers of the Socratic method, forces him
to quote selectively, and build arguments on other such
selective evidence. Again, in a more natural reading of the
Gorgias
,
the dialogue which Vlastos takes to witness the
integrity of the philosopher and philosophic method, a
different conclusion emerges. Socrates does in fact cheat,
and, as I show, cheats for good reasons. To show that
Socrates cheats does not undermine Vlastos' assumptions
about a model philosopher, it only undermines Socrates, and
in his person the philosopher as that model.
In conclusion, while I applaud Vlastos for
singlehandedly reawakening interest in these fundamental
questions, I urge caution in relying on his interpretation
to understand Socrates and his method. Vlastos and Friends
are now forcing a new direction in the scholarship that
frequently discourages the natural reading of texts. I
hope to have shown in this dissertation that although
elaborate explanations of the thought of Socrates are
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inspirational, after a while the explanations may no longer
^©flsc-t the thought of Socrates, but of the interpreter
himself
.
APPENDIX
ELENCHOS AND DIALECTIC
It is well for us to realize in advance that the
term 'dialectic' is not used by all philosophers
with the same meaning.
Alexander, On Aristotle's Topics
In the debate on elenchos, a curious assertion
frequently comes up: That the Socratic elenchos can best be
understood as Socratic dialectic, or that Socratic dialectic
is the method Socrates practices as elenchos . 1 Initially,
two problems arise from the claim that elenchos is the same
procedure as dialectic. The first problem is what G.B.
Kerferd calls the "meaning and reference confusion ." 2 This
is a useful distinction, and it applies directly to the
problem at hand. Those who treat elenchos as 'dialectic,'
seem to be thinking that these two words have exactly the
same meaning, and hence could be used interchangeably.
Admittedly, one might use cognates of the two terms to refer
to the same practice or the same person. For instance, the
person who practices elenchos and the person who practices
dialectic might both be Socrates. Yet, the terms for these
1
I use 'elenchos' and 'Socratic method' interchangeably.
2 Kerferd, p. 62 ff. At issue is the interchangeable use of the
following Platonic technical terms: eristic and dialectic; eristic and
antilogic ; eristic and elenchos ; elenchos and dialectic . See Nehamas
[2], p . 5 ff. for a criticism of Kerferd's view.
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practices need not have the same meaning. Indeed, they do
not. This is a problem, but it is the minor problem.
The second and more important difficulty is this. if
one claims that elenchos is Socratic dialectic, then one
must have some notion of elenchos and some notion of
dialectic. But this is just the problem. Suppose by
'elenchos' one is referring to the Socratic argument
described by Vlastos as "standard elenchos." What is the
counterpart for 'dialectic?' There is no such distinct
practice wo which refer. As I will show, 'dialectic' has
four distinct meanings, but not one of these meanings
matches the practice described as elenchos.
But first, let us take a quick look at how 'elenchos'
and 'dialectic' are equated in the literature. Sometimes
they are used as if they were are synonyms. Gail Fine, for
example, writes one word after another and says, "Elenchus,
dialectic," is "the Socratic method of cross-examination, of
critically testing beliefs against general principles and
examples ." 3 Charles Kahn offers a description of dialectic
as a methodical discussion by questions and short answers.
He thinks, "No doubt this was a genuine conversational
practice of the historical Socrates . . . regularly
exercised in elenchos ." 4 Under the entry "Dialectic,"
Roland Hall offers a different sense of elenchos. He
3 Fine, p.103, fn.34; cf. p.99, p.112, respectively.
4 Kahn [ 3 ]
,
p. 317
.
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writes, The Socratic elenchus was perhaps a refined form of
Zeno's paradoxes, a prolonged cross-examination which
refutes the opponent's original thesis ." 5
Aside from the tradition of associating elenchos and
dialectic, and dialectic with Zenoan paradoxes, there is
another distinguished tradition, in which Socratic elenchos
is understood as precursor either to Plato's dialectic or
Aristotle's dialectic. For instance, R.M. Hare maintains
that elenchos as "the Socratic method of scrutiny ... is
further developed by Plato, who uses the name 'dialectic'
for the developed form of it ." 6 Terry Irwin also agrees
with this idea: "Dialectic is Plato's name for the sort of
systematic discussion that is practiced in Plato's Socratic
dialogues . . . using the Socratic Method ." 7 Some scholars
suggest, on the other hand, that Socratic elenchos can best
be understood as the practice described by Aristotle as
dialectic. For instance, Hugh Benson writes, "Elenchus qua
dialectical argument . . . comes very close to what
Aristotle describes as the dialectical method .
"
8 Eleonore
Stump agrees: "Aristotle wants to codify the Socratic style
s Encyclopedia of Philosophy
,
vol. 1, reprint ed., New York:
MacMillan Publishing Company and the Free Press, 1972, p.385-86.
6 Hare, p.43, cf.14.
7 Irwin [ la ] , p. 7
.
8 Benson [6], p.72 and fn.6. Also see D.W. Hamlyn, p.465: "What
Aristotle says about dialectic in Topics certainly fits to a large
extent with what Plato exhibits as Socratic practice in the earlier
dialogues .
"
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of arguing into an art, the possession of which will make a
person adept at the sort of dialectical disputation Socrates
engaged in ." 9
I am not suggesting that the views listed above are
peculiar to these thinkers, or that the use of 'dialectic'
as a quick replacement for 'elenchos' is novel. The kinds
of assertions made in the current secondary literature are
in fact duplicate earlier ones. For instance, George Grote
used 'dialectic' in the Zenoian sense. He suggested that
Zeno was "the inventor of dialectic: that is, as the first
person, of whose skill, in the art of cross-examination and
refutation, conspicuous illustrative specimens were
preserved ." 1,1 Agreeing with Grote, John Burnet later
claimed, "Zeno [was] the real inventor of Dialectic, that is
to say, the art of argument by question and answer ." 11 He
maintained that dialectic in the Socratic sense is this art
of question and answer . 1 -1 Like Hare and Irwin, Norman
Gulley proposed, "Let us follow Plato and call the Socratic
method 'dialectic '." 13 Richard Robinson also suggested,
g Stump, p.3 ff.
10 Grote, vol. 1, p.96.
11 For more of the same view on method of question and answer, see
Owen, p.214; cf. p.153.
12 Burnet, p.162-64. See Russell, p.92, also for the Zenonian
sense
.
13 Gulley, p . 32 ff; cf. 207, fn.40. Gulley cites Robinson [1] for
this view.
127
"Plato's dialectic presupposes... Socratic elenchus." u
Gilbert Ryle suggested, however, that we must understand
'dialectic' in its Aristotelian sense. He maintained that
elenchos is "identical" with what Aristotle names as
'dialectic' in the Topics. 1 *’
All of these claims naturally depict four 16 senses of
'dialectic'
.
51 Dialectic is the method of seeking knowledge in a
conversation by means of question and answer; elenchos
is that method.
(Fine, Burnet, Kahn, Benson)
52 Dialectic is what Zeno the Eleatic invented in the form
of paradoxes; elenchos is that invention.
(Grote, Russell, Hall, Burnet)
53 'Dialectic' is Plato's name for a method of
philosophical inquiry; elenchos is that method.
(Robinson, Gulley, Irwin)
54 'Dialectic' is Aristotle's name of a particular form of
argument; elenchos is that argument.
(Ryle, Stump, Hamlyn, Benson)
The Origin of the Word
Before I turn to the examination of the abovementioned
senses, let me make some preliminary remarks. First, the
origin of the word 'dialectic' and the origin of the
practice of dialectic may not be simultaneous. 'Dialectic'
14 Robinson [1], p.89.
15 Ryle
,
p . 18 .
16 This may not be an exhaustive list of the different senses of the
word. What is relevant to my discussion are the senses up to and
including Aristotle's. For medieval uses, see Stump; for later uses see
Keywords
,
by Raymond Williams, Oxford University Press, 1976, p.90-91.
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surely is used as a technical term, but to what practice it
refers is the controversial point here. For now, let me turn
to some historical discussion of the origin of the word,
unquestionably one of the most puzzling terms in ancient
philosophy. Etymologically, it means "discussion" or
"debate," or the giving and receiving of reasons in such a
discourse. As to its origin, we have conflicting accounts.
In his Lives of Eminent Philosophers
,
Diogenes
Laertius 17 tells us that 'dialectic' is the name of a branch
of philosophy in which dialectic, the art of reasoning, is
practiced . 18 Diogenes writes,
Dialectic is the art of discourse [dialektikfe he
esti techno logon] through which we either refute
or establish some proposition [ti] by means of
question and answer on the part of the
interlocutors . 14 (trans.
,
R.D. Hicks)
Diogenes attributes to Aristotle the assertion that Zeno the
Eleatic, 21 ’ though he did not use the word as a technical
17 (b.225?) It is generally accepted that Diogenes's accounts of
the thoughts of major philosophers are mostly superficial and often
unreliable. Despite his lack of philosophical acumen, however, he is
one of the most important sources for the history of Greek philosophy,
as many primary sources and earlier secondary compilations are lost. He
has 1186 specific references to 365 books by 250 authors, and 350 books
by anonymous writers from the ancient world.
18 Diogenes, I. 18. The other two are physics and ethics.
Diogenes traces the origin of physics to Archelaus, the natural
philosopher who was the pupil of Anaxagoras, the alleged teacher of
Socrates, and the origin of ethics to Socrates; cf. II. 16; III. 20.
19 Diogenes, III. 48.
Diogenes, I. 18-19.20
129
term, was the "inventor" [heuretfen] of this art . 21
According to Diogenes, who relies on the authority of
Favorinus 22
,
it was Plato who first coined the term
'dialectic' in philosophy [prCtos en philosophia antipodas
Onomase kai stoicheion kai dialektikfen ]
.
23 Plato was also
the first to use the method. This method was one of a
dialogue involving question and answer. Criticizing those
who say that it was Zeno the Eleatic who first argued in a
dialogue form, Diogenes writes, "In my opinion Plato, who
brought this form of writing to perfection, ought to be
adjudged the prize for its invention as well as for its
embellishment . " 24
In his book on Socrates, Diogenes mentions discussion
[dielechthfe] as being important for Socratic philosophy 2 '’,
but he makes no mention of 'dialectic' as a technical term
that Socrates used. Diogenes emphasizes the idea that
Socrates was, first of all, a formidable public speaker
himself, [en tois rhetorikois deinos], and second, he taught
21 Diogenes, IX. 25-26.
21 Favorinus, (c. 80-150), a polymath and a friend of Plutarch. See
Favorina Di Arelate, Opere, ed., Adelmo Barigazzi, Felice le Monnier,
Firenze, 1966, p.219 Diogenes says, "houtos prOtos en erOtesei logon
parenegken, hos phfesi PhabOrinos," III. 24.
23 Diogenes, III, 24.
24 Lives, III. 48. But he also says Euclid studied the works of
"dialect icians
,
whom Dionysius of Chalchedon first named thus on account
of the fact that they arranged the arguments for questioning and
answering," Diogenes, II. 106, my emphasis.
25 Lives, 11.20.
I
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rhetoric [rhetorein edidakse]. Diogenes claims that
Socrates taught the art of argument [teknas logbn] to anyone
who would converse with him [dialegomenols] . But, on
Diogenes' report, Socrates' aim in argument was not to alter
opinions, like other sophists, but to get at the truth [to
alfethes ekmathein] . 26
Another commentator, Xenophon, makes a stronger case
for the significance of conversation in the Socratic
practice. Xenophon says it was Socrates who first
discovered the merit of conversation [ dialegesthai ] for
philosophy, because, on Xenophon's view, Socrates thought
that being skilled at conversation makes men excellent
[aristous] in leadership [hegemonikbtatous] . He writes of
Socrates
,
He said that the best and happiest men are also
the most able at conversation. And he also said
that conversation is named after the act of
getting together to deliberate in common in order
to pick out things [ dialegontas ] according to
their kind. (Mem. IV. v. 12.)
According to Xenophon, Socrates thought that those who
know what any given thing is [ti hekaston eie ton ontbn] can
also expound it to others. Those who do not know are misled
themselves and mislead others. For this reason, a
philosophical discussion makes one an able and happy person.
Here Xenophon seems to be making a distinction based on
etymology, between dialegomai (discuss, reason, talk with)
26 Diogenes, II. 22.
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and dialegO (pick out, sort out, classify)
. There is no
evidence, however, that Socrates made this particular
distinction.
Questioning Xenophon's philosophical acumen, some
scholars turn to Aristotle as the definitive authority on
the origin of the word. Unfortunately, Aristotle's claims
as to the origin of both the word and the art are also
inconclusive. First, it is not clear just who Aristotle
thought the inventor of the art of dialectic was. In the
Metaphysics
,
he attributes the beginning of formal reasoning
to Socrates. He says in Met. 1078b25,
It was natural that Socrates should seek the
essence [to ti esti] of things]. For he was
trying to deduce [ sullogizesthai ] , and the essence
is the starting point of deductions. For there
was yet none of the dialectical power [dunamin]
which enables people even without knowledge of the
essence to speculate about contraries and inguire
whether the same science deals with contraries.
For two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates:
inductive reasoning [epaktikous logous] and
universal definition [to horizesthai kathalou]
.
Both of these are associated with the starting
point of scientific knowledge [archen epist6m£s].
(trans.
,
J. Barnes.)
This is a puzzling paragraph for reasons which cannot be
discussed here in toto. However, it is important to note
that Aristotle makes certain distinctions that he takes to
be self-evident, two of which are of interest for us, that
is, between scientific sullogismos , epagogue 2 and
dialectic. His general point seems to be that even though
27 See my Chapter 3 for a discussion of epagogue.
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Socrates was the first to give attention to sullogismos to
arrive at general definitions, he had yet to acguire
proficiency in dialectic. All he was capable of at the time
was to conduct epagogic arguments. And neither was
formalized as dialectical argument.
On the other hand, again in the Metaphysics
,
Aristotle
names Plato as the one who first instigated the practice of
dialectic. On Aristotle's view, Platonic Forms were indeed
the result of his investigations in dialectic. 28 Yet, he
also seems to think that he himself is the founder of
dialectic, which he developed as a special branch of logic.
In writing Topics, Aristotle says that his purpose was "to
discover [heurein] a method by which we shall be able to
reason from generally accepted opinions." He repeats the
notion of "discovery" in the Sophistical Refutations when he
says that his purpose "was to discover a faculty [or power,
dunamin] which could reason on the problem set before us."
(Top. 100al8 ff., SR. 183a37.) Later commentators follow
Aristotle's lead and claim that it was Aristotle who
discovered and developed dialectic as an art. So,
perhaps the best we can do at this point is to suggest that
Plato, not Socrates— if we grant their difference—used
'dialectic' as a technical term for the first time.
Aristotle used the same name for a special branch of logic.
Perhaps Aristotle had in mind the logical moves one makes in
2X 987b32-34 ; cf. 1004bl9-25.
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the paradoxes of the Zeno, when he attributed to Zeno the
invention of dialectic. Whether or not any of these
'dialectics' refer to the same practice is of course the
controversial topic here. To see whether Socratic elenchos
is any sense 'dialectic'
,
let us turn to the four senses of
this puzzling word.
Four Senses of 'Dialectic'
SI Dialectic is the method of seeking knowledge in a
conversation by means of guestion and answer;
elenchos is that method.
This is the generic sense of the word. It means, roughly,
philosophical conversation . 24 Some claim that dialectic
modeled after a "give-and-take" type of conversation because
it is also the way the human mind works . 111 The general
assumption behind the assertion seems to be this. Since we
cannot get at the "truth" by any direct inspection, we need
to tease it out. The way to do that is in a critical
interplay between the contradictory positions in a
conversation, either by the interlocutors or within the
heart of a single inquirer.
29 As used by A . E . Taylor, Gulley, Vlastos [7a], Kosman, Rorty,
Seeskin. A quick inspection of any major dictionary shows that the
following characteristics are regularly attributed to dialectic as a
philosophical conversation: that it seeks "truth", and that it
"resolves contradictions" in "systematic" reasoning, it is a critica
interplay" which takes place by way of question and answer.
30 A . E . Taylor, p.155-156. See Seeskin, p.22-24; also Richard Lewis
Nett leship: " A process analogous to that of questioning others goes on
in the mind of a single inquirer." Lectures on Plato's Republic, 2nd
ed.
,
1901, reprint., New York: St. Martin Press, 1967. 278-79.
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In a famous scene Socrates grows impatient with
Protagoras' long speeches to his seemingly simple questions.
He says to Protagoras, "You will have to cut your answers
short if I am going to follow you." Protagoras protests by
saying that if he had to cut his answers short, he would not
be superior to anyone in public speech. This makes Socrates
conclude
,
[Protagoras] would no longer be willing to go on
answering in a dialectical discussion, so I considered
my work with him to be finished, (trans. Lombardo and
Bell. ) 31
No doubt drawing on these scenes and others, many scholars
think of 'dialectic' as a conversation conducted in question
and short 32 answer format. So SI seems to equate the art of
dialectic with a conversation in which short answers are
given to a questioner.
Now if SI is true, dialectic and elenchos are
interchangeable. But if all that is meant by 'dialectic' is
"discussion conducted in question by short answer," and
elenchos means exactly the same, then SI is of course only
vacuously true. Therefore, SI fails to be philosophically
significant. Let us then turn to S2, to see if that is any
help
.
31 Pr. 334d-335c; cf. G. 449b-c.
32 A controversial claim is that there might be two different modes
of elenchos, one short and one long. See, Nehamas [2], P-5, fn.9, fn.10
Dodds, p . 195 , f n . 4 4 9 c 2 ; Gulley, p.28-31.
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S2 Dialectic is what Zeno the Eleatic invented in the
form of paradoxes; elenchos is that invention.
This is a popular claim that the seed of the Socratic
elenchos could be found in the paradoxes of Zeno. As we
have seen, this claim is due to Aristotle who said that Zeno
is the father of dialectic. Despite the influence of his
paradoxes in philosophy, our information on Zeno's life and
philosophic achievements is scant, and comes, not
surprisingly, from the famous story in Plato's Parmenides
(cf . 127e-128c) In the dialogue, Zeno explains to
Socrates that he was incensed at the opponents of Parmenides
who ridiculed his ’’Theory of One." He reads the arguments
he had written down as a young and contentious man against
those who maintained that there are many existences. 34 In
each argument, Zeno says, he attempted to offer proof
[tekmferion] that there does not exist many things [ou polla
esti]. His intention was to show that this argument, if
carried out, was more laughable [geloitera] than Parmenides'
hypothesis that there exists one [hen esti].
Since Proclus, scholars have dubbed Zeno's attempts to
reduce the opponents' proposition to absurdity as the first
33 For the view that the dialogue might be historically accurate,
see Vlastos ' entry, "Zeno the Eleatic" in, Encyclopedls of Philosophy ,
vol . iv
,
p . 369
.
34 cf. 128el: Zeno also says that these arguments were written in
the spirit of controversy when he was a young man; and someone stole
them from him.
instance of reductio . 35
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However, opinions are split about
the form of these puzzles . 16 Jonathan Barnes convincingly
argues that the surviving fragments of Zeno contains no
reductio as a technique for disproof. The original
contribution of his method, according to Barnes, was to
merely expose paradoxes by taking his opponent's hypothesis
and deriving contradictory conclusions from it. "But he
never makes the characteristic move of reductio
,
the
inference to the falsity of the hypothesis ." 37 Kirk and
Raven suggest that we simply do not have enough reliable
information (both Plato and Aristotle either misrepresent or
give conflicting descriptions of Zeno's reductions) to be
able to make conclusive statements about the form and plan
of these arguments. The best we can say of these arguments,
they suggest, is that they were "antinomies," by which Zeno
derived contradictory consequences from a given thesis. 3K
Another proposal, offered by John Burnet, states that the
only thing we can say about Zeno's arguments is that they
were ad hominem. They were designed to attack and shame
35 Zeno is said to have worked out forty of these reductions.
Barnes argues that they were possibly in the following form: P (there
exist many things); If P, then {Q and not-Q}. Q and not-Q may have
consisted of pairs of opposites such as {like and unlike}, {large and
small}, {equal and unequal}, {finite and infinite}, and so on.
36 See Kirk and Raven [1], p.264-65.
37 Barnes, p.236. Barnes also argues that it is doubtful that Zeno
a) had a plan to defend Parmenides, and b) Parmenides was a monist; cf.
p . 2 3 1
.
38 Kirk [1], p.264-65. Hussey has a similar view, see his p.99 100
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those who ridiculed Parmenides, and as such they were
entirely successful. 39
So, what earned for Zeno the title as the founder of
dialectic? Some scholars suggest that Zeno was among the
first who composed dialogues. Since dialogues are "the
earliest known manifestations of Grecian dialectic," Zeno
must therefore be the inventor of dialectic. 40 Aristotle in
one passage refers to "the answerer and Zeno the
questioner," thereby suggesting that he may have used a
dialogue form in conducting his arguments. (But he is also
quoted as giving others the honor of being the first in
composing dialogues.) 41 But nothing in the testimonies of
descriptions of the arguments conclusively supports the view
that Zeno's reductions were in a dialogue form. 42
In what sense, then, is S2 true? That is how is
elenchos supposed to be Zenoan reductios
,
assuming for a
moment they are reductios ? If by S2 one means that Socratic
elenchos also exposes paradoxes, then there is the problem
of showing that every elenchos has this feature, which is of
course not true. There is an more important obstacle for
S2
,
which Vlastos calls the problem of "unasserted
Burnet, p. 82-85.
40 Grote, vol.I, p. 96 ff. He cites for authority Diogenes, IX. 26-
28. But Diogenes claims in Book III. 48 that in his opinion it was Plato
not Zeno who first wrote dialogues.
41 Diels-Kranz, 29, A14.
4: See Freeman, p.154.
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premises . " It was standard for Greek forms of argument
and refutation, as in geometry, to proceed from either
hypothetical or unasserted premises (cf. Euclid's geometry,
1.5). Each of the reductions attributed to Zeno operates on
exactly these sorts of premises, i.e., "if there are many
things" [ei polla esti], or "let it be so" [estb]. However,
elenchos for Socrates is, first and foremost, an argument
from the asserted premises of the respondent. So, even if
Zeno is claimed be the inventor of ingenious philosophical
puzzles, those puzzles are not the sort elenchos is supposed
to be. Therefore, S2 is false. Let us then turn to the
Platonic sense of 'dialectic' to see if that provides help.
S3 'Dialectic' is Plato's name for a method of
philosophical inquiry; elenchos is that method.
This is the claim that what Plato names explicitly in
the later dialogues, under the proper name 'dialectic', is
the same practice as what he has Socrates practice as
elenchos in the early dialogues. Thus, although Plato does
not use the word in the early dialogues, dialectic for Plato
is what elenchos is for Socrates. This is a strange claim,
because settling exactly what 'dialectic' means for Plato is
no easy task.
Plato uses 'dialectic' mostly in connection with
metaphors and poetic imagery, and the term does not always
have the same meaning. It seems to be at once a road and a
43 Vlastos [1], p.2-3; cf. Vlastos [7a].
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method, an art, a science, a journey of the soul, and a
power of reasoning, and the task of division and collection.
Exactly what dialectic is a road to or an account of, Plato
gives us no help. In the Republic
,
when Glaucon asks
Socrates to give him a definition of dialectic, a
description of its nature and divisions, and its ways,
Socrates grows impatient with the question. He says those
who ask such a question will not be able to follow him any
further, for he, Socrates, can only show analogies, "images
and symbols" of his meaning, not the very truth itself
(533al-3). In an attempt to explain Socrates' frustration,
Paul Shorey suggests that Plato does not want to state a
principle or a method, or an absolute definition of
dialectic, because that would only lead to
misinterpretation. Therefore, conclusions to which they
might lead can only be suggested by images and symbols, and
only to those whose own experience have prepared them to
understand. 44
Let us now take a look at some of the images and
symbols that Plato uses to describe the function and nature
of a dialectic. The dialectician is the wise farmer who
knows the art of planting and raising that which is self-
sufficient. In the Phaedrus , he says of the wise farmer,
When one employs the dialectic method [dialektikfe
teknfe] and plants and sows in a fitting soul
intelligent words [epist6m6s logous] words which
44 Shorey, p.200.
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are able to help themselves and him who planted
them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from
which there spring up in other minds words capable
of continuing the process forever (276e-277a)
,
45
The dialectician is also the hunter who knows what he
has caught and what to do with it. By analogy,
geometricians and astronomers are said to be hunters; they
hand over their discoveries to the dialecticians to use
properly, as they themselves do not know what they have
acquired and how to make use of their prey. Socrates says
in Eud . 290c5 that geometricians and astronomers,
not knowing how to use their prey but only how to
hunt, they hand over their discoveries to the
dialecticians [ dialektikois ] to use properly.
(trans.
,
Lamb.
)
The dialectician is also a good butcher. For, a bad
butcher would break the parts, when he tries to cut the meat
according to the principle of "dividing things by classes
where the natural joints are," {Phdr . 265e2) . The butcher
who is skilled at cutting well is called a dialectician,
"whether the name I give to those who can do this is right
or wrong, god knows," {Phdr. 266b9)
Dialecticians are also heroes because they are wise and
clever. Like heroes they have special talents, one of which
is the ability to ask and answer questions, (Cra. 398d7,
390cll, d5)
.
45 trans., Lamb, p.568.
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Aside from theses metaphors, Plato most frequently uses
'dialectic' as a way a road, a method, Dialectic is the [he
dialektikfe methodos]
. ( R . 511b, 533c; Prm
.
135 ff; Phlb.
16b, 58a) . In fact, it is referred to as "the best" and the
"first" method, [malista kai prdton ten methodon]
. ( Pltc
.
285d9.) Socrates remarks ruefully in Philebus
,
for
instance, that dialectic as the ideal method has eluded him
in his youth. 46 Now that he is older and wiser he knows
that "there certainly is no better road [than dialectic]
,
nor can there ever be." But, as Socrates admits, this road,
this method is "one which is easy to point out but very
difficult to follow." (Phlb. 16b7).
What does Plato understand by his method? How does it
work? Plato gives us various answers; while all are
evocative, none is specific. Dialectical method mainly
involves a way of collecting and dividing ( Phdr . 265d; cf
.
Sph. 253), and knowledge thereof (Phlb. 58a, Eud
.
29b, Cra.
390c; Sph. 253). Plato mentions dialectic as ability to
divide by forms [kat' eide dunaton einai diairein] . (Pltc.
286e; cf. Phdr. 265d6) Dialectic primarily concerns itself
with the knowledge of "what is common" to all things and
collecting and dividing dispersed pluralities according to
46 Presumably, this remark is referring to young Socrates who
could
not reply to Parmenides' criticism of the Theory of Forms in
the
Parmenides, i.e., "The Third Man Argument."
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their kind [kata genos]
:
47 This is the knowledge and
ability to distinguish how individual things can or cannot
be associated with one another, (cf. Sph. 253e.)
Dialectic as a method of division and collection, and
knowledge thereof is no common matter; it is a special gift
from the gods. Dialectic was handed down so that the
mortals learned the way in which all existing things are
arranged. It is a search and a hunt for what each thing is,
that which neither comes into being, nor passes away, but is
always identically the same. There is no other method of
inquiry other than dialectic which systematically attempts
in every case to grasp the nature of each thing as it is in
itself and stands as "the coping stone" of the whole
structure of reality, (cf. R. 534a ff.). 4s Socrates,
reportedly a lover himself of division and collection as
aids to speech and thought, remarks that he will follow any
man, "as if he were a god," man who is able to see things
that can naturally be collected into one and divided into
many. ( Phdr . 266b6, trans. Fowler.)
The serious task that the philosopher has as the master
dialectician will be to operate, not with assumptions like
47 The controversial point here is whether or not kind [genos] is
synonymous with Form [eide].
48 The final status of the Forms and what is to be considered real
in the later dialogues of Plato is a matter of scholarly controversy,
which is well beyond the confines of this paper. The controversy has to
do with the fact that the Forms of the Republic, which constitute the
only objects of reality there, are ontologically suspect in Philebus,
Theaetetus and in the Sophist.
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the mathematician, but only with what is real and beyond
hypotheses. He will embark upon an "upward journey of the
soul," during which he will be trained in mathematics,
astronomy, and music4g before he gets to dialectic. With
mathematics he will be dragged out from the cave to a point
where he can see shadows and reflections. As for reaching
summit where he will look directly at the things themselves,
and unaided by his sense will "see" the real. Plato writes,
[ P] hilosophic discussion [ dialegesthai ] [is
needed] by one who aspires, through the discourse
of reason [logon] unaided by any of the senses, to
make his way in every case to the essential
reality and perseveres until he has grasped by
pure intelligence the very nature of Goodness
itself. This journey [poreian] is what we call
dialectic. (R.532a) Sl1
Just as one needs grammar to know which letters join
with others in making certain words, and an art of music to
dissect the connection of sounds, a special ability is
needed for the journey of dialectic, ( Sph . 226c, 227b,
253c5)
.
Reason [logos] itself provides this ability
[dialegesthai dunamei]. {R. 511b, 533a; cf
.
Phlb . 57e;
dialectic as a voyage of reason through arguments, Tht
.
186;
R. 511b; Phlb. 58d5.) The soul is or has the faculty which
views the essence of that which is common to all things,
49 Timaeus, one of the later Platonic dialogues, takes up Astronomy
and Harmonics as demonstrating the beautiful and harmonious order of the
heavens and of sounds. There is no mention of dialectic there,
presumably because these sciences do not know what to make of their own
discoveries
.
50 Cornford [1], p.252.
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reflecting within itself. For it is impossible to grasp
that is which common to all either through hearing or
through sight. (Tht. 185-186). It is thus with the cognitive
power of dialectic that one achieves knowledge, for
knowledge is not in the sensations but in the process of
reasoning about them (Tht. 186d)
,
performed by the soul. 51
The power of dialectics enables reason to rise to that
which requires no assumption and is the starting point
of all things [panthos archen] . 52 ( R . 511b7)
S3 claims that dialectic and elenchos are the one and
the same. How in the Platonic sense is elenchos dialectic?
Some scholars have suggested that the greatest science of
dialectic can only be practiced in a question and answer
format, since this format is essential to the discovery of
truth. And since Socrates is engaged in conversation,
dialectic and elenchos are the same method. Although
Socrates is involved in conversation in the early dialogues,
a customary pastime for Athenians, there is nothing in the
later dialogues to indicate that conversation is essential
to the supreme method. Perhaps all what is meant by S3 is
that elenchos shares with the dialectic the general features
of hunting for the truth. This would indeed be a very weak
sense in which S3 is true. If S3 is the stronger claim that
elenchos is identical with Platonic dialectic, I hope the
51 See for alternative translations of "soul," Cornford [1], P-104.
5: See Shorey, p.110 note a, and p. 114 note c on the controversy
over the description of "arche" as applying to transcendental first
principle
.
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abovementioned distinctions and difficuties have shown that
the assertion is false.
S4 'Dialectic' is Aristotle's name of a particular form of
argument; elenchos is that argument.
S4 states that the form of argument described by
Aristotle in the Topics [Top.] and Sophistical Refutations
[SR] is the method earlier used by Socrates. D. W. Hamlyn's
claim is typical: "What Aristotle says about dialectic in
the Topics certainly fits to a large extent with what Plato
exhibits as Socratic practice in the earlier dialogues." 51
Let us see how this could be true. If dialectic is the same
kind of conversational argument for both Socrates and
Aristotle, it must contain the same kind of premises.
Famously, Socrates conducts conversational arguments with
whoever is willing to talk and reason with him, (Ap. 29d;
30a) . In his god-given mission he seeks to find the answer
to how one ought to live, and tests everyone's opinions on
the subject, (G. 500c3-4; cf. 487e-488a; R.I 352d) . When he
engages someone in an argument, he emphatically demands that
the interlocutor say what he truly believes, not something
that is in truth contrary to his beliefs, (G. 500b; R. 346a;
Cr. 49c-d) . For Socrates, all opinions should be honored,
whether it is of the wise or the majority, (Cr. 47a-d) . If
someone puts forward an opinion of the wise or of the many,
53 Hamlyn, p.465.
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he treats that as one's own opinion and examines it as if it
had never been tested before. After he gets the
interlocutor to assert what Socrates takes to be his real
beliefs, Socrates proceeds with his elenchos by using such
beliefs as premises of his arguments.
For Aristotle, on the other hand, of the four54 kinds
of arguments used in philosophical discussions, dialectical
arguments are those which start from premises which state
generally accepted opinions [ek tdn endoxOn] and proceed to
contradiction [ antiphasebs ] .
"
(SR. 165b.) Dialectical
arguments are designed to explore the implications of what
most people believe. Dialectic is conducted in a question-
and-answer format, "for such a proceeding always involves a
relation with another party." (Top. 155b9-10; cf . 'Yes' and
'No' questions, Top. 158al7-18; SR 172a34ff). Peirastic,
on the other hand, are examination-arguments. They are
conducted with the intention of examining, specifically, the
beliefs of the interlocutors, premises are the opinions held
by the answerer [ek dokountbn apokr inomenO ] . These opinions
must necessarily [anakaidn] be the opinions of the answerer,
as he claims to have knowledge of the subject in question.
(SR 165bl-6 ; cf. Top. 159a25 ff.)
54 Didactic [ didaskalikoi ] , dialectical [ dialektioi ] , examinational
[
peirast ikoi ] and contentious [eristikoi].
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Given the textual evidence for Socrates' insistence on
operating on the opinions of the answerers, 55 it is clear
that Aristotle's dialectic does not operate on the same
kinds of premises as Socrates' elenchos. So in what other
way can they said to be similar? Perhaps we can try to
answer the question by investigating further how they are
different. The most telling difference between Aristotle's
dialectic and Socrates' elenchos is for whom they are
intended. Aristotle is quite adamant that dialectical
arguments are not everyone's cup of tea. He sees the
function of dialectic as discovering an ability 56 [heurein
dunamin) which could reason on the problem proposed from
most generally accepted premisses that exist. "This is the
function [ergon] of dialectic in itself." (SR. 183a38-bl)
.
So Aristotle he thinks of dialectic as a special skill. The
whole purpose of the Topics and Sophistical Refutations is
to present a "handbook" of sorts to develop and sharpen this
skill and empower the participant in argumentation.
Aristotle warns the reader that dialectic also takes a
special patience. It cannot be practiced by anybody.
Practicing beginners quickly turn to contentious arguments
and employ any means to come up with a contradiction, (Top.
164b5-15 ) . Therefore, he warns the would-be dialectician
55 For Vlastos' say-what-you-believe-rule, see my Chapter Three.
56 Some translations render dunamin as a "faculty," which would be
too strong. For Aristotle means dialectic to be a skill the right sort
of person can learn.
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not to conduct this argument with everybody. He says, "You
ought not practice dialectic with everybody [ouk hapanti
dialekteon] , " for at the hands of casual persons [tuchontas]
dialectic can deteriorate, and turn into a base argument
[ponerologian]
.
{Top. I64b8-10.) Dialectic should best be
conducted with other dialecticians, not the multitudes.
(Top. 157al7-25)
Clearly, Socrates is also worried about this problem.
He too complains about the young and inexperienced debaters'
insistence on winning rather than conducting an argument for
truth, ( R . 539b2-5; Phlb. 15e) . However, it is also clear
that he conducts elenchos with anyone who is willing to
converse with him. For listen to what Socrates says about
his art: "I examine anyone of you I happen to meet at any
given time," (Ap. 29d) "whomever, young or old, citizen or
foreigner," (Ap. 30a). Elenchos, more than being a special
skill that only a few can have, is a skill anyone competent
enough can learn. In fact, Socrates complains that young
men, once they learn from him how to use elenchos, go around
applying it to others. (Ap. 23c5)
.
Socratic elenchos, far
from being the choice tool of the philosopher for other
philosophers, seems to be a philosophical instrument for the
nonphilosopher to use.
If the nature of their premises are different, and
their respective practitioners are different, in what way
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can Aristotle's dialectic, and Socrates' elenchos still said
to be similar? Perhaps we can turn to their subject matter.
Aristotle's dialectic is perfectly general. Aristotle tells
us that dialectic depends on common principles which do not
fall under any one art. (SR 170a37 ff.) "Dialectical
argument is not about something definite [ti horismenon]
,
nor does it demonstrate anything [deiktikos oudenos] ." {SR.
172al2-13 ff.) For dialectic is common to every art;
someone without any scientific knowledge can use it to
examine another who is also without knowledge. Socratic
elenchos, on the other hand, is first and foremost about the
moral life. The subject matter is almost always is about
affairs of morality, whether moral virtue can be taught, who
is happy, how one ought to live and the nature of happiness.
Though it can be practiced by anyone, it must always be
about moral issues.
If Aristotle's dialectic and Socrates' elenchos do not
operate on similar premises, and are not operated by similar
people, do not require the same subject matter, is there any
other way can they still said to be similar? I think the
answer is in the Sophistical Refutations. In a puzzling and
complicated statement, Aristotle states dialectic and
peirastic arguments are both arts of examination. While the
former examines general opinion, the latter is concerned
with the opinions of the interlocutor. Accordingly,
everyone, including the private people [ididtai], i.e.,
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nonexpert users, can make use of both of them—though it is
best if the experts use them to conduct arguments with other
experts. Nonexperts of dialectic and peirastic use them to
test those who profess knowledge. In that sense, all
ordinary users of dialectic and peirastic use them as
refutations [elenchousin hapantes] . This is due to the fact
that the nonexperts perform the task unmethodically
[ateknds], and experts perform it methodically [enteknds],
and that is called 'dialectic'. Accordingly, the person who
carries out an examination [ peirastikos ] by means of the art
of reasoning [tekne sullogistik£ ] is a dialectician." (SR.
172a35-37
.
)
Perhaps only as a mode of examination elenchos can be
said to be similar to Aristotle's dialectic. However, as we
have seen, elenchos is best understood as Aristotelian
peirastic. If by S4 it is claimed that elenchos is in this
special sense Aristotelian dialectic, the relation is too
tenuous to warrant as strong an assertion as S4 . It is
therefore best to try to understand elenchos in its own s
without attempting to reduce it to other practices.
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